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PREFACE 
The following Report was written mainly for, and addressed to, the 
authorities of the North Solomons Province of Papua New Guinea. It is now being 
published and distributed in the belief that it may be of interest to a wider circle of 
readers, as an example of the. application of social science research to a Pacific 
Island society undergoing relatively rapid change due largely to operation in its 
midst of a large European-owned and managed industrial enterprise (in this case a 
mine). 
The background to the Report is described in ·the author'S Bougainville: A 
Personal History, which was published by the Melbourne (Australia) Press in 1973 
and distributed in the United States by the University Press of Hawaii. 
Several monographs and articles written by the researchers engaged in the 
project have appeared in print since the writing of the Report, but because these 
were not available at the time the Report was written, and hence did not 
contribute to its findings and conclUSIons, they are not listed in the References; nor 
has the text of the Report been subsequently amended to reflect data and 
conclusions in those later monographs and articles. 
iii 
Douglas Oliver 
Honolulu, July 1980 
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 
The Honorable Dr. Alexis Sarei, Premier 
North Solomons Province 
Papua-New Guinea 
Dear Dr. Sarei: 
January 1978 
As you know, several scholars from Papua-New Guinean, Australian, New 
Zealand and American universities have during recent years been studying a few of 
the changes that have been taking place in the Province's society and economy, 
since Bougainville Copper began its operations there. While some of our researches 
have focused on topics of more academic than practical interest (e.g., on the 
processes and consequences of modernization in a rural Melanesian setting), it has 
also been our purpose to provide you and your associates with data that might prove 
to be helpful to you in connection with your task of planning for the Province's 
social and economic well-being. 
The researches alluded to were sponsored by the University of Hawaii, with 
which I am associated, and by a group of scholars at the Australian National 
University (under the leadership of E. K. Fisk), who now constitute the Council 
A.N.U. Development Studies Centre. The finances for most of these studies were 
provided by Bougainville Copper Ltd., whose managers were as generous with their 
financial and logistical support as they were scrupulous in their regard for the 
independence of the research. 
Attached hereto is a list of the reports written or being written by the 
scholars involved in this programme. Some of these reports have already been 
published, some are complete but await publication, and some are nearing 
completion. Accompanying this letter are copies of the reports already completed, 
both published and unpublished; copies of the others will be sent to you as soon as 
they are completed. 
As you will see, the reports listed concern a very wide spectrum of the kinds 
of changes that have been taking place in the Province in recent years: 
demographic, social, political, administrative, economic, etc. It would require a 
very lengthy volume to summarize the reports' findings on all those aspects-a task 
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that would be redundant and probably not very useful. In many of the topics 
reported on you and your associates are better informed than any outside 
researchers could ever hope to be. After all; you have been principal actors 
involved in many of them! 
There is however. one aspect of the Province's recent changes that, while 
crucial and almost inexorable, is less palpable than most others, and therefore 
deserving of special emphasis. I refer to Bougalnvillians' growing dependence upon 
money, and their prospects for obtaining the money they believe they must have to 
satisfy their recently acquired material wants. 
This is not to say that material things (and related services) are the only 
things that Bougainvillians want, or that money is the only means of acquiring those 
material things. In recent years, for example, they have demonstrated 
dramatically their desire for a larger measure of political autonomy. Also, they 
evidently place high value on ethnic unity and distinctiveness, and-verbally, at 
least-on some aspects of cultural continuity. In a real crisis I expect that 
Bougainvillians could and would forgo the goods and services that require money; 
they did so during World War II, and could conceivably do so again. But, their 
dependence upon money has increased immensely since the War, and future money 
deprivation would doubtless be, for many if not most Bougainvillians, a painfully 
traumatic experience indeed. 
At the same time, Bougainvillians have on the average relatively large money 
incomes, higher than those of the indigenous residents of any other Papua New 
Guinea District or Province. Moreover, it seems likely that their monetary 
incomes will remain relatively high for several years to come. On the other hand, I 
will attempt to show in the report that follows that, if some present trends 
continue-trends in demography, land use, consumer choice, etc. Bougainvillians 
will become increasingly dependent upon money at a rate that the money-earning 
capacities of many Of not most) of them will not keep pace. 
The principal factors in this pessimistic formula are the Province'S small size 
and remoteness, its rapidly increasing indigenous population, that population's 
appetite for goods and services obtainable only with money and its methods and 
propensities for earning money. In this report I will attempt to summarize and 
where possible document these factors. To do so I will draw on personal 
observation and on data contained in the reports of members of our research 
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programme-supplemented by data collected by some other researchers not 
associated with our programme (e.g., Donald Mitchell, Jill Nash, and Eugene Ogan). 
The report has been read by some of my fellow researchers (i.e., Messrs. Bedford, 
Connell, Fisk, Hamnett, and Mamak) and contains some corrections and 
amendments suggested by them. However, its interpretations and conclusions as a 
whole are not necessarily representative of all their views. Some of them may 
share my views, in whole or in part, but the report should be read as reflecting 
mainly mine. 
Needless to say, it has been a most interesting and intellectually rewarding 
experience to take part in this research programme, and I wish to thank you and 
your associates-along with Bougainvillians in general-for giving us the privilege 
of doing so. I hope that some of what we have reported on will be of use to you and 
your Government in your planning for the Province's future well-being. 
Respectfully yours, 
Douglas Oliver 
vi 
--- Sutxl'strocls 
--- Ccn.IUS [J,slncls 
o 10 10 30 40 50 km 
~I_~I~~I--~I--~I--~I 
BOUGAINVILLE 
(Reprinted from "Taim bHong mani" Monograph No. 12, Development Studies 
Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1978) 
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1. Material Wants and Needs 
The main focus of this report has to do with the material well-being of the 
Bougainvillians* and the means they have for achieving it. At first glance that 
would seem to be a simple and straightforward matter to generalize about, but 
some reflection suggests otherwise. It would be easy enough to define that "well-
being" in terms of irreducible biological needs-e.g., the amounts and kinds of food, 
liquid, oxygen, sleep, etc. required to maintain life and to support physical activity 
at average levels of expenditure. Sl,lch matters have been well studied elsewhere, 
and minimal need formulae have been established for individuals of different sex, 
age, body size, etc. The difficulty arises in trying to discover what the individuals 
themselves consider essential for their material well-being. When suffering the 
pangs of hunger or thirst or lack of air or when overcome with fatigue, the desire 
for food or water, etc. dominates all other wishes; for all contemporary 
Bougainvillians those biological survival needs are well enough satisfied most of the 
time to permit them to think about and wish for other satisfactions, including 
material goods either to consume directly or to use in attaining non-material ends. 
In an earlier writing (Bougainville: A Personal History) I set down what I 
believed to be the Bougainvillians' conceptions of "The Good Ufe"-first, as those 
goals were prior to the colonial era, and then as they were at the time of writing, 
about five years ago. Regarding the pre-colonial Bougainvillians' desires for 
material goods I wrote as follows: 
The individual Bougainvillian was no less preoccupied with food 
than most Westerners, and had very definite ideas about what 
constituted a satisfactory menu. Undoubtedly everyone would have 
enjoyed a steady diet of starch-, vegetable-, and oil-puddings and a 
quantity of fatty pork, but the scarcity of these foods limited them to 
festive occasions. It would not have occurred to anyone to hope to 
eat such luxury foods everyday; on the other hand the fact that such 
luxuries were eaten so infrequently added even more individual 
enjoyment and social -importance to the occasions when they were 
actually served up. Moreover, while they did not favor excessive 
overeating (either for personal contentment or as a mark of 
affluence), neither were they constrained in their appetites by notions 
*Throughout this report the word Bougainvillian(s) will be used to refer to 
the indigenous inhabitants of Bougainville and Buka. This includes the few 
Niuginians of non-Bougainvillian ancestry who also consider Bougainville-Buka to be 
their permanent homes. 
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about nutritional balance or weight control. (Yet very few of these 
islanders were fat.) 
Any thoughtful islander leafing through the advertisements in a 
popular European magazine could not fail to be struck by their 
preoccupation with comfort: with the desirability of avoiding 
anything causing physical discomfort such as painful illness, minor 
variations in heat or cold, unyielding chairs or beds, discomfort from 
certain kinds of noises and odours, pain from physical exertion 
devoted to work (but not to play), etc. Perhaps the pre-European 
Bougainvillians disliked physical discomfort as much as present day 
Europeans do, but it is quite clear that much less thought and effort 
were expended by them to aHeviate it. 
Owning land was considered by many to be as desirable as having 
kin. Some men with only small land-holdings were able to achieve 
social influence through war-making skill or political shrewdness, but 
even for these the desire for large land-holdings was a powerful 
motive in life. Such feelings about land were in part sentimental: 
nearly every matrilineage had its sacred place, where its deceased 
members' bodies or charred bones were deposited, or where according 
to myth its ancestress first appeared. In addition, land was 
recognized as being the basis for most other forms of wealth: food 
crops, pigs and shell money. (The crops were necessary for feeding 
the pigs, and pigs were the principal item of exchange for shell 
money.) 
As for the latter, tangible wealth in the form of surplus plant 
food, pigs and shell money was almost universally sought after, and 
although large hoards of these items did not in themselves indicate 
political influence, it was possible to achieve or maintain such 
influence only through generous handouts of them. 
Another intangible evidently desired by many was prestige, the 
renown that derives from doing praiseworthy deeds. In the minds of 
these islanders several kinds of action merited praise: fine 
craftsmanship, skillful hunting and fishing, successful magic making, 
aggressive fighting, and, most important of all, open-handed 
generosity. 
and concerning this point 
'Generosity', to many Europeans, means glvmg something for 
nothing. The pre-European Bougainvillians also practiced this kind of 
transaction on occasion, but usually only among the closest of kin. 
Like ourselves they may have honoured such altruism as a utopian 
ideal, applicable to all fellow tribesmen; but realistically they 
probably did not expect it to take place outside narrow circles of 
kinship and friendship. Among all other persons the receipt of a 
service or object carried with it the obligation of a return, even 
though it may have been labelled a 'gift' at the time. And the kind of 
giving most favoured among these islanders was feast-giving: for the 
quantities of food (including luxury foods) thus received, the guests 
were expected to bestow praise on their host. Moreover, with such 
verbal praise-the highest form recognized-went a degree of social 
respect, and hence social influence, and even some political 
authority. 
As for the extent to which these desires were actually satisfied I wrote: 
In attempting to learn how well Bougainvillians were able to 
satisfy their life goals with the means provided by their environment 
and customs, a good deal of guesswork is involved. In connection with 
food, there seems to have been enough available, in quantity and 
variety, to satisfy all individuals' everyday expectations (and also to 
fulfill most of their nutritional needs as defined by scientific 
criteria). Warfare must have served to reduce some tribes' food 
supply now and then, but there is no evidence of the kind of periodic 
and widespread famine so characteristic of other parts of the world, 
and no indication that some members of any tribe were significantly 
less well fed than others. There were of course regional variations in 
food supply, e.g. coastal dwellers were able to consume more fish and 
coconuts than mountaineers, but it seems unlikely that the latter 
would have considered themselves endemically deprived on that 
account. 
A similar answer may be given with regard to expectations about 
physical comfort. For example, they had enough spare time, raw 
materials and craft skills to make their dwellings much more 
comfortable in the European sense; the fact that they did not do so 
can perhaps be taken to mean that they were content with what they 
had. 
The desire for land-specifically, the desire to remain on and utilize one's 
own land-seems also to have been achieved by most Bougainvillians of that early 
era. There are cases reported where people were displaced from coastal areas by 
immigrants from elsewhere, but those were probably exceptional. 
The desire for wealth-i.e., pigs, shell money, surplus food-as a means of 
achieving social influence and political power was not so easily and universally 
satisfied. These goals, by their very nature, had to be competed for, and as the 
goods used in doing so were not unlimited in supply it follows that not every man 
desiring more-than-average influence and power was able to achieve it. (It may 
be-probably was-the case that not every man desired more-than-average 
influence and power, but it is just as likely that some men who did desire it fell 
short of their goals.) 
Now, after decades of contact with Europeans many Bougainvillians' goals 
for material well-being have changed in kind and quantity. And while some of their 
newly-acquired goals are attainable within present means, many BougainviHians 
desire some other objects and services that only a few are ever likely to obtain. In 
fact, in terms of social and political considerations one of the most, if not the 
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most, important differences between contemporary Bougainvillians and their 
ancestors lies in this widening gap between their material goals and their ability to 
attain them. Formerly most people were able to attain most of their basic 
material goals; this is less true of the present and unless deliberate measures are 
taken to reduce it the gap between wants and satisfactions will become even wider 
in the future, thereby resulting in a large reservoir of social discontent-But this is 
getting ahead of the argument. 
A fully comprehensive and representative listing of the kinds of goods and 
services Bougainvillians now want, and an estimate of the extent to which they now 
satisfy those wants, would require far more data than I have access to. Such data 
would include findings from Province-wide surveys of individuals' want lists, 
household inventories (showing goods purchased and the order in which they were 
purchased), records of store sales, etc. etc. Some of these facts are contained in 
the research reports I am drawing on (e.g., Mitchell, Moulik), but only for the 
places treated in those localized reports. Other facts bearing on this matter have 
been gleaned from my own observations around the Province-e.g., in rural and 
urban dwellings, in trade stores and supermarkets. These factual fragments cannot 
compare with a comprehensive scientifically-conducted survey in terms of 
representativeness and detailed accuracy, but such a survey would be very 
costly-and for the purpose of this report is not indispensable. 
In pre-colonial times, I propose, adult male Bougainvillians fell into two 
somewhat indistinct categories with respect to their desires for material goods. 
(For present purposes I assume that most women shared or at least supported the 
wishes of their husbands in this regard.) Most men were content in having only 
enough vegetable food to satisfy hunger-plus desires for special dishes on special 
occasions; enough pigs and shell money for periodic domestic feasts and for 
carrying out prescribed social responsibilities; enough housing for weather-proof 
shelter; enough tools and (in some cases) water craft for subsistence. A second and 
smaller category of 'pre-colonial' men comprised those who wanted to obtain or 
control the distribution of some of the above objects-mainly food, pigs, and shell 
money-in order to maintain or acquire more-than-average social influence or 
power. (As mentioned above, it may be that all or most Bougainvillian men had 
some yearnings towards those political goals; however, in the societies that I have 
known or read about only a few men acted as if they believed themselves qualified 
to achieve those goals.) 
4 
In terms of their material wants present-day Bougainvillians present a more 
complex picture; instead of two categories they appear to differentiate into at 
least five. 
First, there are those who acquire goods, traditional and "modern," mainly 
for the use of themselves and their family-mates including additional kinds and 
amounts needed for domestic celebrations and for carrying out social obligations 
(e.g., bride price, mortuary donations, hospitality). These individuals correspond to 
the first of the two pre-colonial types described above, except that they must now 
be differentiated into sub-types: 
l(a). Those, mainly older, individuals who spend all or most of their lives in 
their villages and who live fairly "traditional" lives. Some of them earn modest 
cash incomes, principally through cash-cropping, with which they purchase small 
amounts of modern goods: tinned meat and fish, rice, bottled beverages, tobacco, 
sugar, clothing, lamps, kerosene, etc., plus perhaps radios, bicycles and bedding. 
l(b). Somewhat younger (on--the-average) individuals who live in urban or 
peri-urban places, or who circulate between village residence and urban 
employment, or who earn fairly large incomes from cash-cropping. These 
individuals are similar to those in category l(a) in being strictly "consumers," but 
they acquire and use more modern 'goods than the latter-e.g., more store-bought 
food, more modern houses and furnishings, more vehicles, more radios, etc. It may 
be objected that what I have divided into two sub-types of "mainly consumers" 
consists in reality of a single continuous category whose members differ from one 
another only in terms of quantity of modern goods consumed. However, I believe 
we have to do here with two different kinds of consumers-the one firmly 
"traditional" in their consumer wants, the other significantly more "modern" in 
theirs. (Regarding the former, I know of individuals who have evidently chosen to 
live a traditional style of life even though possessing enough money to be 
otherwise.) 
There are also to be found in the Province a number of men who correspond 
to the pre-colonial Big-man type-i.e., men who want goods not only for 
consumption by themselves and their families, but also for distribution (in the form 
of feasts and other displays of hospitality), for the purpose of acquiring social and 
political influence. These also may be divided into two types: 
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2(a). Some of these contemporary Big-men continue to use "traditional" 
goods in their distributions (although using some "modern" goods for personal 
consumption), while others-
2(b). include many "modern" goods and services in their distributions as 
well-e.g., kina, store-bought food and beverages, vehicular transport of goods and 
services, information about and intervention with Government. 
(3) Finally, there are several Bougainvillians whose material wants and 
satisfactions differ so widely from those of their compatriots that they need to be 
placed in a category of their own. I refer to those few who appear to have chosen 
to live European material lifestyles just as completely as their incomes will 
permit-in housing, food, clothing, recreation, etc. Unlike some corresponding 
persons in, say India or Africa, I know of no Bougainvillian in this category who has 
pointedly rejected the traditional Bougainvillian lifestyle as something uncouth and 
distasteful, but they nevertheless do attempt to live in urban or peri-urban areas, 
and most of them are salaried-although some of them supplement their salary 
incomes from cash-cropping or other businesses. All of them that I know about 
have completed secondary education and many have undergone some measure of 
• 
tertiary education. Some members of categories two and three have also engaged 
in secondary education, and a few in tertiary, but category three members are 
generally higher-educated than the others. (Note: Higher does not necessarily 
mean "better.") 
The above typology is based on consumption wants-on the kinds and 
relative amounts of material goods (both objects and services) desired, and in 
varying measures acquired, by the persons being typed. Another typology relevant 
to this discussion is the one proposed by the social psychologist, J. K. Moulik, who 
carried out research on Bougainville in 1972-74 and whose report (Bougainville in 
Transition) has just come to hand. Dr. Moulik's study focused on household heads 
residing only in the Kieta and Buin sub-Districts (in the Guava, North Kieta, and 
South Kieta census divisions of Kieta; in the Lugakei, Paubake, and Siwai census 
divisions of Buin). However, from my casual observations elsewhere, I believe that 
the categories he has elicited-though not necessarily their proportional represen-
tatives-would be found to be applicable throughout all Bougainville and Buka. 
Moulik's study was concerned mainly with certain psychological factors as 
they were revealed through survey-type interviewing and observations. While such 
methods cannot provide the depth of information and insight supplied by long-term, 
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intensive anthropological-type observation in single communities, it has the merit 
of being applicable to a much larger population sample, especially when carried out 
with the degree of knowledge, perceptivity, and scientific rig our that characterized 
this particular study. 
The psychological factors that Moulik focused on were those believed by 
some psychologists to exert strong influences on an individual's ability to adjust 
successfully to "modern" forms of economic activity. The research method has 
been tried out, with some persuasive findings, in many other places around the 
world where "traditional" (i.e., "subsistence") forms of economic activity are being 
transformed into money and market-exchange forms. Moulik had previously carried 
out similar research in mainland Papua New Guinea and was therefore well 
sensitized to the kind of economic life found on Bougainville. A basic proposition 
implied in this study is the one shared by other researchers, including 
myself-namely, that all adult BougainviUians want some money, or goods that can 
be acquired only with money but that they differ (within certain limits) in their 
abilities to acquire that money_ Some of these differences are due to their 
inequalities in capital resources-mainly land; others to the location of their 
residences (e.g., distances from markets); still others to level of education and 
experience; etc. etc. But Moulik asserts, with considerable persuasiveness, that 
the relative strength of three kinds of motivational drives also has an important 
bearing on money-earning in a society like that of present-day Bougainville. In the 
technical terms Moulik uses, these drives are (1) need for achievement, (2) need for 
affiliation, and (3) need for power. 
Need for achievement, according to Moulik's usage, is positively related to 
entrepreneurship and response to economic opportunities, e.g., a person with high 
need-for-achievement "prefers moderate risk to high and low risk situations; he is 
confident in predicting his performance and he likes taking personal responsibility 
for his actions." On the other hand, a person having a high degree of need-for-
affiliation tends to do the kinds of things that will bring him the approval of his 
peers, to "choose friends over experts to work with." And a high rating in need-for-
power indicates a strong desire to control the actions of others-in other words, it 
is "the political means used to achieve economic or other ends." 
Tests designed to reveal the proportions of these three kinds of motivational 
drives were administered to 453 male heads of households-228 in Buin and 225 in 
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Kieta sub-Districts. From the results Moulik divided the tested individuals into 
five types, which he labelled and characterized as follows: 
Entrepreneurial managers, i.e., those having a medium level of achievement-
motivation, a high level of power-motivation, and a low level of affiliation-
motivation. In Moulik's words: 
Looking at these psychological characteristics, one can identify 
entrepreneurial managers in the Bougainville situation in the persons 
of the leaders of 'interest associations', such as producers' and 
consumers' co-operatives, 'holding companies' related to transport, 
construction and retail business, etc. The 'interest associations' have 
two clearcut objectives: first, they seek to represent an 'interest' of 
a group of people, and second, they attempt to assert independence 
from expatriate dominance. In order to achieve their objectives, they 
try to exploit all possible money-earning activities by obtaining 
governmental and non-governmental assistance, by utilizing local 
resources and by drawing on new sources of wealth in their 
communities. These new sources of wealth could be cash cropping, 
wage-employment, compensation money given by the copper mine, 
share-holding, etc. In other words, an entrepreneurial manager is a 
person who is ready to participate in any kind of money-earning 
activities and even to try to influence other members of his 
'association' or 'group' to do the same, so long as it satisfies the 
association's objectives. Apparently, this entrepreneurial manager 
group, although very small in size, is comprised of 'big peasant elites' 
representing the class interest of the 'interest associations'. The 
active members of these 'interest associations' are also mostly from 
the same 'big peasant elite' class. The entrepreneurial manager of 
the 'interest associations' usually seeks power and prestige for the 
interest group as well as for himself, rather than personal economic 
aggrandisement; he does this by obtaining control of the provision of 
government and non-government support services at the local level 
and usually by arranging the production and marketing of a certain 
agricultural commodity in a manner serving the interest of the 
association. Among the respondents under report, Kieta villagers 
seemed to have a slightly larger proportion of leaders with the 
motivational characteristics of entrepreneurial manager than did the 
BuIn villagers. 
Entrepreneurs, i.e., those being high in achievement-motivation, low in 
affiliation-motivation, and medium in power-motivation. According to Moulik 
those typed as entrepreneurs are 
... people who start or expand small businesses. The key to their 
success has turned out to be what psychologists call the need for 
achievement, the desire to do something better or more efficiently. 
Again there seemed to be only a slight difference between Kieta and 
Buin villagers; a marginally greater proportion of Buin villagers have 
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demonstrated the motivational qualities of entrepreneurs than Kieta 
villagers. However, the proportions of respondents with entrepreneur 
characteristics were relatively low in both subdistricts. Who are 
these entrepreneurs? They are the keen innovators eagerly exploiting 
the new ideas of cash earning activities, especially cash crops, retail 
and wholesale trading, truck-transport business, etc. The 
motivational make-up of the entrepreneur is different from that of 
the entrepreneurial manager. Entrepreneurs are successful in setting 
up a small business and running it profitably as long as it remains 
fairly small and manageable, but they become less effective when the 
business expands and when the entrepreneur is required to manage a 
larger organization and to recruit and work with a large number of 
people. In other words as long as the enterprises are limited to a 
manageable challenging situation, the individual entrepreneur is 
effective because he still operates in the framework of achievement 
motivation with characteristic concern for competition and using 
oneself for achieving the competitive goal. But as soon as the 
situation demands helping others to give their best and supporting 
them to be effective, the relevance of achievement motivation 
becomes less and is overtaken by power motivation which is the 
characteristic of the entrepreneurial manager. Among the respon-
dents under report, almost all the entrepreneurs were members of the 
'interest associations' as described before in connection with the 
entrepreneur ial manager. In other words, the entrepreneurs among 
the village elders of Kieta and Buin sub-districts tended to have the 
'big peasant elite' class background as did the entrepreneurial 
manager. 
The money-earning activities of these entrepreneurs follow a 
certain uniform pattern. Apart from membership and shareholding in 
the 'interest associations', their major aim is to own or set up some 
off-farm business enterprises. The indigenous private traders of cash 
crops and the wholesale trader of vegetables from Siwai who obtained 
contracts to supply weekly requirements to the copper mine and to 
the school at Kieta are examples of such entrepreneurs. Although the 
major thrust of their efforts is to own a business enterprise, the 
entrepreneurs are also deeply involved in village-based money-earning 
activities such as cash cropping and marketing of subsistence 
produce. They are also keen to supplement their incomes and savings 
from wage-earnings, by obtaining wage employment either for 
themselves or for members of their households. But to them wage 
employment is a temporary phase, resorted to when it is thought 
necessary to supplement their other cash incomes to generate 
sufficient savings for investment in business enterprises. The 
entrepreneurs would not wish to continue in wage employment beyond 
the point where they felt comfortable with the success of their 
business enterprises. 
Moulik's third and fourth types, subsistence farmers and peasants, constitute 
opposite ends of a continuum rather than sharply distinct categories. 
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Subsistence farmers, i.e., those low in achievement- and power-motivation, 
high in affiliation-motivation. In Moulik's words these are 
mostly elderly villagers without any wage-employment experience 
and with strong affiliation to the traditional norms of tribal clans who 
in effect remained isolated from the main-stream of the money 
economy by deliberately not participating in it fully. Most of these 
subsistence farmers have a relatively low resource base (land), and 
this does not permit them to shift their attention and labour to cash 
cropping in a major way. Even if switching their resources from 
subsistence to the cash crops promised some monetary gain, they 
would be obliged to reduce their subsistence output to grow the cash 
crop. Given the low land resource base, this would make expansion of 
cash crop production a hazardous undertaking, leaving no margin to 
meet the risk involved if something went wrong with their cash crops. 
It is therefore quite rational and justifiable for the subsistence 
farmers to be hesitant about entering fully into the money economy 
by way of cash crop production or other money earning activities. To 
try to explain the behavior of the subsistence farmers entirely in 
terms of motivational conservatism is unconvincing. On the other 
hand, it is perhaps this resource constraint, or more specifically the 
size of the margin of surplus productive capacity over the desired 
subsistence requirement that makes the subsistence farmers motiva-
tionally weak in money-earning activities. Not only do the 
subsistence farmers become motivationally weak, but they also try to 
rationalize their weak response to money-earning activities in terms 
of a protest against the 'ills' of the modernist onslaughts. Among the 
sample respondents, for example, the subsistence farmer group was 
most vocal in its complaints against the breaking down of the 
'glorious' traditional norms of the tribal society. 
As Moulik points out, no contemporary Bougainvillian is totally isolated from the 
monetary sector; the label subsistence farmer signifies merely relatively greater 
dependence upon traditional patterns of production, exchange, and consumption. 
Peasants, i.e., those low to medium in achievement- and power-motivation, 
medium to high in affiliation-motivation. Dr. Moulik characterizes these as 
follows: 
Motivationally, the peasant farmers are more favourably disposed 
than the subsistence farmers to operations in the monetary sector, 
with relatively higher achievement and power motivations. Perhaps a 
relatively larger land-resource base contributes to their motivational 
profile. But compared to the first two groups, the entrepreneurial 
managers and the entrepreneurs, the motive configurations of the 
peasant farmers is far less strong in that they remain basically 
dependent on land-based economic activities furthered by supplemen-
tary incomes from other money-earning activities such as wage 
employment. With their relatively large land-resource base, this 
group was able to take the risk of utilizing the money-earning 
opportunities by devoting a major share of their resources to cash 
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crop production even at the cost of subsistence production (while in 
most cases maintaining a minimum required subsistence level of 
production for sustenance). Such a major switch over to cash crop 
production was further facilitated by the growth of communications, 
transport, and marketing facilities. But in the process of their shift 
toward greater commitment to the money economy, the peasants 
ceased to be self-financing. As a result, there were changes in the 
economic organization of labour resources among the peasant 
families. To a certain extent the peasant family started depending 
upon its younger men-that is, the father at one stage, the son at 
another-for a cash income which it could not do without, but the 
major portion of its cash income was derived from village-based 
economic activities, particularly cash cropping. Having enough land 
to grow cash crops and a market for their produce, a peasant family 
has the choice between staying at home and farming its land or 
earning the cash that is needed in some wage employment away from 
home, and the choice is partly a matter of rational calculation based 
on the estimated difference in return, taking into account the fact 
that a stipulated wage is paid regularly, whereas the independent cash 
cropper has to bear his own risks. 
In other words, as Moulik puts it, 
.•. motivationally the peasant farmers seek to keep a foot in both 
worlds. They regard the viHage as home and cash cropping as their 
main vocation, while wage employment is considered as a short-term 
sojourn, supplementary to the primary concern of cash cropping. 
Eventually the wage earners of the peasant families settle down in 
the viHage when they have had enough of wage labour. Since the 
peasant farmers are motivationally committed to vll1age-based 
activities and village life, but closely linked with the urban economy 
and outside market, their need for affiliation with traditional tribal 
values and norms get weakened, but not substantially eroded. In 
operational terms, a peasant farmer would be willing to disregard 
traditional norms and values only if it helps him in his cash cropping 
enterprise; otherwise he would maintain the expected traditional 
relationships with viHage people. 
Peasants constituted about one-third of all of Moulik's respondents, 
entrepreneurs about one-tenth, subsistence farmers about one-thirteenth, and 
entrepreneurial managers less than one-fifteenth. The remaining respondents, over 
one-half of those questioned, were classed as "indifferent"-not because they were 
unmotivated or psychologically detached from the issues involved in adjusting to 
new kinds of economic circumstances, but because they did not fall into anyone of 
the fairly clear-cut categories just itemized. According to Moulik, the 
"indifferent" group was in between the subsistence farmers and the peasants in 
terms of achievement-and power-motivation, but lower than either in terms of 
affiliation-motivation. 
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As an in-between group, the behavioral traits of both subsistence 
farmers and peasant farmers can be observed among the members of 
the "indifferent" group. In ownership of land, members of this group 
were almost equal to or slightly better off than the subsistence 
farmers, but they were nevertheless far below the level that could 
satisfy their motivational demand. Compared with the situation of 
the peasant farmers, further expansion of cash crops beyond the level 
already achieved by the "indifferent" group was either physically not 
possible or economically not viable. In addition, quite a few of the 
"indifferent" members were situationally constrained in that their 
villages were located in isolated interior (or hilly) areas or were at a 
considerable distance from the market centres. On the other hand, 
being constrained in cash crop expansion the "indifferent" group 
seemed to exploit subsistence resources fully. It was this group, for 
example, who were most keen to take the opportunities to market 
subsistence garden foods in the markets as retail sellers. But the 
cash earned from occasional retail sales of subsistence produce in the 
weekly food markets was too small to satisfy their motivational 
demand. 
For the "indifferent" group therefore the strategy of the 
subsistence farmer was unsatisfying, whilst the strategy of the 
peasant farmer was not available to them. Since they did not have 
the inherent motivational drive of entrepreneurs, the only course left 
to them was to stagnate in their level of participation in the money 
economy. This 'stagnation' and the resulting frustration tended to 
weaken their need for affiliation to traditional norms and village life, 
and for many the only workable strategy seemed to be involvement in 
wage employment as a major source of money income, thus breaking 
away from the stagnating village economy. In this respect, the wage-
employment opportunities in BCP in particular, and in other town-
based jobs in the Panguna/ Arawa/Kieta complex in general, were 
important motivating factors. Most often, however, they did not 
have proper information about these wage-employment opportunities. 
But this did not deter many of them from visiting their few 'wantoks' 
who were already working in these towns, in search of wage 
employment. 
The deliberate choice of wage employment and often active 
seeking for it should not be construed as an indication that the 
"indifferent" group wanted to make a complete break away from their 
village life and permanently involve themselves in wage employment. 
To the extent that the "indifferent" group had the behavioral traits of 
the subsistence and peasant farmers' groups, they wanted to maintain 
their links with their village activities without being too emotional 
about it. If a member of this group were fortunate enough to have 
wage employment in the town, it is likely that he would send some 
money to the home village (at least during the initial years); and he 
would make occasional visits to the village (not initially, but later 
maybe once a year). In other words, he is likely to stay as a wage 
worker in the town longer than a member of a peasant family, but 
now permanently. As an ultimate aim, he wants to return to his 
village 'one day' and live there. Unlike other motivational groups, 
however, the "indifferent" group was not very choosy about the 
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location of wage employment; they certainly had a preference for 
Bougainville district, but were not unwilling to go to other parts of 
Papua New Guinea. * 
Moulik presents the distributive results of his findings in a graphic manner, 
which is reproduced below: 
Entrepreneurial Managers 
Entrepreneurs 
Peasant farmers 
51.2% Indifferent 
4.5% t-----------1-----------~ 2.5% Subsistence farmers 
Summarizing these findings he writes, 
At the bottom more than half of the pyramid is occupied by the 
motivationally weak and economically disadvantaged groups of 
'indifferent' and subsistence farmer categories; about one-third of the 
pyramid is occupied by the medium level group of peasant farmers; 
and lastly, only about one-eighth (the top) of the pyramid is occupied 
by the highly motivated and economically (socially and politically too) 
advantaged group of entrepreneurial managers and entrepreneurs. 
*To add a personal view: although any attempt to categorize humans 
psychologically-to attempt to pigeonhole the countless and protean varieties of 
human personalities-is inevitably artificial, I am nevertheless impressed by the 
verisimilitude of Moulik's typology, as I expect many other long-term observers of 
the Bougainville scene will be. As I read through his characterizations I thought, 
time and again: "Ah! that fits so-and-so to a tee." 
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Another interesting and perhaps highly significant thing revealed by these 
distributions is the close similarity obtaining between the Kieta and Buin samples. 
Despite their closer proximity to the mine and other urbanizing-industrializing 
activities (and their much longer and more direct contact with pre-mine economic 
colonialism), the Kietans continue to be like their more rural Buin counterparts in 
the psychological features measured by this study. And while one would expect 
some even wider differences between Kietans, and say, Aitas or Konuas, in these 
respects (e.g., the physical isolation of Aita would tend to inhibit entrepreneurship 
and peasant-type productivity), the inference that may be drawn from the Kieta-
Buin similarities is that the typology itself (and in some measure the overall type 
ratios) may apply to the Province as a whole. 
In the course of his study, Moulik also investigated the job aspirations, etc. 
of a large number of secondary-school students normally resident in the Kieta and 
Buin sub-districts. Not surprisingly, he found a close similarity between them and 
their parental generation sub-district mates in motivational patterns. While the 
students tended to hold professions of medicine, political leadership, priesthood, 
engineering, and government official in the highest respect, most of them 
pragmatically aspired to and expected to obtain more feasible money-earning 
jobs-in which respect they seem to have conformed to their parents' reasons for 
financially supporting their post-elementary schooling. 
As will have been noted, some correspondences exist between the two 
typologies just described-between the one based on consumption pattern and the 
one based on motivation. (For example, Moulik's subsistence farmer closely 
resembles the traditionalistic, non-Big-man villager in consumption pattern.) 
However, resemblances or differences aside, the conclusion to be drawn from the 
proportional features of both typologies is that money-earning, by one means or 
another, has become a major preoccupation of most Bougainvillians. Moreover, 
indications are everywhere apparent that this trend is on the increase. And while 
motivation is a very important factor in influencing the amount of effort people 
will devote to money-earning, other factors such as skill, natural resources, job 
opportunities, and economic infrastructures, will determine to a large extent how 
and how much of that money is actually earned. So, in assessing the Province'S 
economic potential as this relates to the material welfare of its indigenous 
residents, we begin with a projection about the number of people whose material 
wants will have to be reckoned with in any planning concerning the Province's 
economic future. 14 
2. Population 
In 1939 Bougainvillians numbered about 45,000. (This is of course a very 
rough figure, put together from both head counts and guess work, but it is perhaps 
, as nearly accurate as we are ever likely to obtain.) Moreover, it is plausible to 
assume that the population had not changed much in numbers during the five or six 
decades preceding 1939-i.e., that it had reached and maintained a constant state 
geared in with the technological, etc. circumstances that prevailed during the early 
stages of European contact. (For example, any natural increase in population 
numbers resulting from cessation of warfare and improvements in health may have 
been offset by the absence from home of reproductively active plantation-working 
men.) 
For the year 1939 the least unreliable figures on sex and age come from the 
Buin sub-District, where the population was relatively non-mobile and fairly 
accessible to Administration census patrols. At that time the ratio of males to 
females was calculated to be 1 to 1.14, and "children" constituted about 36 percent 
of the total population. There is no reason for doubting the first of these 
percentages-though similar in shape, the laplaps of that era left no uncertainty 
about the wearers' sex!-but the figure on age is dubious, to say the least. (In the 
absence of recorded birth dates the census-taking Patrol Officers classified as 
"children" all those that they judged to be under fifteen.) 
World War II had a devastating effect on the District's indigenous population; 
in some places as many as one-half of the residents died from the direct or indirect 
effects of the war. With the return of peace, however, there began a process of 
increase that has continued with dizzying momentum. These increases have been 
recorded, after a fashion, in a succession of postwar censuses. And while these 
censuses are accurate enough to indicate general Province-wide trends, the 
sampling and counting procedures they were based upon render them inadequate as 
tools for serious social and economic planning. For example, published figures on 
the 1971 census do not distinguish between Bougainvillians and Indigenes from other 
parts of Papua New Guinea (and there were large numbers of the latter employed 
on plantations and on mine construction projects at the time). Also, while the 1971 
census distinguished between "rural" and "urban" segments of the indigenous 
population, and while it is plausible to assume that the 78,700 persons listed as 
15 
"rural" were mostly Bougainvillians, it is not reported how many Bougainvillians 
were included in the 11,700 indigenes listed as "urban." In any case, whatever their 
imprecisions and ambiguities, the official censuses of that period do indicate that 
Bougainvillians were increasing in numbers at a rapid rate, and, by the end of 1977, 
will have reached a total number in excess of 100,000. 
For a more accurate estimate of population trends among indigenous 
Bougainvillians one must turn to the studies carried out by individual researchers in 
recent years. One such was Friedlaender's anthropometric surveys of 1966-67 
centered in certain villagers in Aita, Eivo, Simeku, Nasioi, Torau, Uruava, and 
Siwai. While some demographic differences were found to exist among the various 
SUb-populations studied, they all revealed characteristics of "explosive" 
growth--e.g., a disproportionately large number of children as compared with 
adults, a median population age of 16 years (as compared with a median age of 27 
years for Australia), and a high birth rate coupled with a relatively low death rate. 
Friedlaender notes that the substantial decline in crude death rate followed the 
establishment of anti-malaria and anti-yaws campaigns in the early 1960s. 
Even more detailed are the studies carried out more recently by Shoffner, 
Connell, Hamnett, and Mitchell. While these studies concern only small samples of 
the total population, they are based on close and long-term observations, and 
include a wide range of the Province's cultural areas. 
The first of these samples comprised the residents of three beach villages in 
the Teop-speaking area-Teop Island village itself, Unonovi, and Sunvahora. The 
researcher, K. Shoffner, lived there for over fifteen months in 1973-74 and knew 
the residents by sight and name. By use of written records and historical-calendar 
methods of dating, Shoffner was able to establish ages with a high degree of 
accuracy, with the following findings: 
The total population of the three villages was 431, of which 193 were fifteen 
and under in age (97 males, 96 females)-in other words, a very "young" popUlation 
and hence one undergoing a very high rate of increase. While in Teop, Shoffner 
recorded fourteen births and three deaths-a rate of increase amounting to about 
three percent per annum. Fifteen months is, of course, too brief a period for 
calculating credible long-term population trends, but such trends can be predicted 
fairly accurately by plotting a population's age and sex profiles. 
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The second of the more intensive population studies available to us is that of 
J. Connell, who carried out research in Siwai in 1974-76. According to Connell's 
credible estimate, in 1939 the Siwai numbered about 5000-which, in comparison 
with earlier estimates, represented a slight but steady increase. Then the war 
intervened and served to reduce the number of Siwais by about lOOO-through a 
combination of increasing death rate and decreasing birth rate. After the war, 
however, the Siwais began to increase at a very fast rate. By 1975, according to 
Connell's own careful counts in eight villages, supplemented by figures from 
official censuses and mission records, the population had reached about 9000 and 
was continuing to increase at a rate that would result in its doubling in numbers in 
about twelve years' time. (This estimate, based on annual percentage increases, is 
supported by the figures on age distribution-e.g. according to the 1975 census 31 
percent of the population were less than ten years Of age and only 15 percent were 
over age 45.) 
The third of these studies was carried out by M. Hamnett in the Atamo area 
of Eivo-Simeku. The population of the three villages in which Hamnett conducted 
censuses (one Eivo, one Simeku, and one mixed village) was 949 in May 1975. The 
ratio of males to females was 1.09 to one. This population too was very "young" 
with 49.3 percent of the population being less than 15 years of age. The rapid 
growth indicated by the age structure of the population is confirmed by both 
administration census figures and Hamnett's own data on population increase. 
Administration figures show an increase of 250 percent over the period 1945-72. 
Friedlaender reports that the rate of natural increase rose from 2 percent per year 
to 5 percent per year in the 1960s. (Hamnett's own figures show a rate of 2.8 
percent per year for one of his three villages during seventeen months in which he 
recorded births and deaths.) 
The fourth study is one that was carried out intermittently by D. and J. 
Mitchell in Nagovisi between 1969 and 1973. According to their own observations 
of births and deaths in a population segment of 445 individuals during the period of 
their field work, that segment increased at the rate of 4.18 percent per annum-an 
increase 'that if sustained over time would result in a doubling of the population in 
about 16.5 years. An even more intensive study of the demographic features of a 
smaller part of that Nagovisi segment (namely, the Waina clan of Biroi) led D. 
Mitchell to describe its growth in the following terms: 
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The conservative estimate, based on the crude rate of natural 
increase, implies a doubling time of about 18 years. The more precise 
estimates, based on the actual individuals, known to me, who will be 
involved in reproduction, implies a doubling time on the order of 11 or 
12 years. The most conservative position I can imagine-allowing for 
maximum error on my part, maximum negative effects of unpredict-
able events {but not allowing for contraception of any kind)-would 
be for a doubling time of about 15 years, equivalent to an average 
rate per year of about 4.7%. My personal opinion is that such a 
(projected) rate is too low. 
Mitchell then goes on to state: 
The Waina are by no means exceptional. Such information as I 
have on other groups in the area suggests that they are quite typical 
in their birth spacings, marriage patterns, and the like. There is a 
possibility of some downwards movement in fertility in those groups 
(such as the people of Konawa viHage) where, because of land 
shortages, the bulk of the men are away for relatively long periods. 
Other than this, I see no signs of slackening population growth 
anywhere in Nagovisi. 
The rapid increases in the populations of these smaller areas can be 
attributed to a number of factors. A decrease in infant mortality probably due in 
part to the anti-malaria and anti-yaws campaigns in the early 1960s and, in part, to 
better natal and pre-natal care available at the Missions, is probably most 
responsible for the population increase. There is also evidence that "traditional" 
attitudes toward birth-spacing are changing-i.e., many people are no longer 
abiding by traditional taboos that discouraged women from having sexual 
intercourse until their previous children were weaned. 
Generalizing from the above studies, and from censuses cited earlier, the 
Province'S indigenous population must be viewed as growing at a fast and 
accelerating rate. In some areas the rate is such as to bring about a doubling of the 
present numbers in periods as short as 11 and 12 years, and nowhere is the doubling 
period more than twenty-five years. (In comparison, it would require 77 years for 
the population of Australia to double by natural increase.) As just stated, the 
reasons for this increase are manifold: better health care in general and better 
infant and maternity care in particular, fewer killing diseases, the relaxation of 
traditional rules regarding birth-spacing, etc. But whatever the reasons, the fact 
of the increase must be reckoned with in any plan having to do with maintaining or 
improving the population's material welfare. 
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Other characteristics of the Province's indigenous population that are 
directly relevant to its economy are its distribution and mobility. Anyone who has 
travelled, and especially flown, over the Islands will have been struck with the wide 
differences that obtain in population density. Even leaving out of account such 
physically inhospitable environments as the higher mountain zones and the 
forbidding swampy lowlands, there are many areas whose low or very high densities 
cannot be accounted for by their geographic qualities alone-e.g., the vast empty 
stretches between Toimonapu and Tonolei as contrasted with the densely settled 
parts of nearby Buin. Perhaps most of the present-day patterns in population 
density are continuations of settlement patterns fixed in pre-colonial time, but 
some of them represent residential adjustments to influences, mainly, economic, 
that began two decades ago and are now operating with increasing weight. 
A century and more ago the principal influences determining the locations of 
settlements were economic and 'military'. Proximity to good gardening land and/or 
good coastal fishing grounds seems to have been the main criterion-plus, in 
coastal areas, defensibility against maritime marauders. What constituted "good" 
garden land depended in part on certain qualities of soil, drainage, and 
slope-although the workable ranges of possibilities in these factors were quite 
wide. Another factor almost as important was the land's previoLls state. With the 
stone tools then in use clearing virgin forest was an extremely slow and arduous 
job, so that people usually cycled their gardens within areas of prior clearing 
whenever possible-and because of the slow rate of population increase in that era, 
that seems to have been possible most of the time. Of course, some population 
growth did take place, including natural increase and immigration, but compared 
with the rate of recent decades it was glacier-slow, and there was still much 
unused space to move into until World War II. 
In pre-colonial times most Bougainvillians tended to remain close to their 
birthplaces throughout most of their lives. This was more characteristic of the 
coastal and plains-living people than of the mountaineers, but even the latter 
tended to move about within quite narrow bounds. Most of them tended to marry 
people living close by, and would have found it hazardous to travel very far, 
although there were some areas where trade, visiting, and even marriage took place 
across language and tribal boundaries. Some inland residents (mainly in the north) 
visited distant coastal settlements to engage in trade, but elsewhere goods were 
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traded from place to place by short and discontinuous links. And in the south and 
east most of the travelling, for trade or war, was done by maritime indigenes from 
Shortland and Mono. 
The mobility of most Bougainvillians began to increase with the appearance 
of Europeans, and has been accelerating ever since. With the outlawing of inter-
tribal fighting it was no longer so hazardous to move about, but few Bougainvillians 
(except for those working on coastal plantations, or off attending Mission schools) 
actually did so, and nearly all of the absentees eventually returned and remained at 
home when their indenture or schooling was finished. 
Later on, large numbers of individuals were moved about in the course of 
World War II but with few exceptions most of the survivors subsequently returned 
to the neighborhood, if not always to the identical location, of their prewar homes, 
and remained at home for the next decade or so. 
The first massive postwar movement began in the late 'fifties, when several 
whole settlements migrated from inaccessible inland areas to sites nearer the 
coast, in order to produce and market cash crops recently introduced. Such 
movements occurred mainly in the northern half of Bougainville Island, and 
involved particularly the Konua, I<eriaka, and Aita. Elsewhere people tended to 
remain in their traditional home areas and transport their cash crops to coastal 
markets as best they could. 
This period also witnessed some renewed movement on the part of 
individuals, for schooling and work, but with the spread of cash-cropping fewer left 
home to work. 
Then beginning about a decade ago, there commenced anew, large-scale, 
and greatly accelerated movement that shows no sign of diminishing. The 
establishment of the copper mine necessitated the moving of several entire 
settlements, but in terms of volume most of this current residential movement 
involves individuals and single families, for periods ranging from days or weeks, to 
'permanent' residential change. Almost all moves of this type are from rural areas 
to the Kieta-Arawa-Panguna urban complex, without doubt one of the most 
momentous social processes now taking place in the Province. 
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In addition to the residential movements just listed, the last decade has 
witnessed an incalculably large increase in travelling-marketing, buying, visiting, 
sightseeing, etc. People whose grandparents rarely moved beyond the safe 
boundaries of their homelands and whose parents regarded a ten mile journey as a 
major expedition, now think nothing of motoring fifty miles to sell their wares or 
purchase tools, or of flying a hundred miles for a brief social visit. Such mobility 
as this constitutes a whole new dimension in Bougainvillians' lives; in addition to its 
economic costs and consequences, it contains large implications for political and 
social change. 
Having touched on two of the most economically salient features of the 
Province's indigenous population-its explosively fast numerical increase and its 
accelerating spatial mobility-there remain to be mentioned three other features 
that bear directly on the Province's changing economy, namely, the population's 
physical health and its psychological readiness and mental-technical qualifications 
for participating in the kind of economic activities likely to prevail in the 
forseeable future. The population's psychological readiness was discussed in the 
previous section; in a word, most Bougainvillians are ready and eager to participate 
in the new economy (although on their own terms). As for their mental-technical 
qualifications for engaging in "modern" market-type economic activities, this can 
only be evaluated in terms of the job-preparation training they are receiving in 
school and at work-a subject that deserves closest scrutiny but one that I am 
unable to deal with in any competent way. Hence only the matter of physical 
health will be touched upon here. 
"Touched upon"is an appropriate label for the little that I am able to say on 
this subject. 
The major diseases that afflicted Bougainvillians prior to World War II were 
yaws, malaria, tropical ulcers, scabies, pneumonia, skin diseases, injuries from 
accidental causes, infections of the upper respiratory tract, leprosy, pulmonary 
tuberculosis, goiter, cerebro- and spinal-meningitis. Since then some of these 
diseases have been reduced in incidence (e.g., yaws and malaria) and the duration 
and discomfort of many others have been alleviated considerably by treatment in 
clinics and hospitals. Moreover, up to a few years ago it was possible to assert that 
few symptoms of the so-called 'diseases of civilization' were evident: namely non-
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infective bowel diseases (appendicitis, colitis, diverticulitis, polyps and cancer of 
the bowe!); obesity; diabetes; hypertension, arteriosclerosis; and such eye diseases 
as color-blindness, myopia, astigmatism, and glaucoma. By 1977 however evidence 
of obesity was beginning to appear in urban areas, and in some rural areas as 
well-a familiar tell-tale of increasing affluence, sedentary occupation (and 
perhaps a growing fondness for beer!). I do not know the extent to which any of 
those other marks of 'civilization' are beginning to appear, but would be surprised if 
they did not surface, at least in the urban areas. 
Notwithstanding all these ailments (the 'indigenous' ones still not eradicated 
and the new ones on or just below the horizon) Bougainvillians seem to be a fairly 
strong and healthy people, well capable of coping with the physical demands of 
their new economic activities. Despite the predictions of some experts, the partial 
or in some cases total changeover to store-bought foods has not resulted in an 
overall deterioration of health-on the contrary, the increased protein content of 
some of these foods has had nutritionally beneficial effects. On the other hand, 
signs of obesity indicate that too much of the store-bought food, even if 
wholesome, can tip this balance the other way. And as a visit to almost any 
store-whether supermarket or village stoa-will show, a large proportion of 
Bougainvillians' hard-earned money is being spent on 'junk' foods and drink (e.g., 
cheese savouries and loliwara)-on things of little or even negative nutritional 
value. 
I will not burden this report with another tirade against the Bougainvillians' 
already copious, and if anything increasing, consumption of alcohol. Suffice it to 
say that it represents not only a large hazard to physical health and social 
tranquility but to economic health as well. 
With the vision-one might even say spectre-of the Province's future 
population numbers in mind, we turn now to the natural resources and institutional 
opportunities available to that population for satisfying its increasing material 
wants. 
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4. Man-made Material Resources 
The Province also contains several man-made resources that must be 
reckoned with when planning for its economic future. Chief among these are its 
commercial plantations already in being; its areas of secondary-vegetated arable 
land; its transport and communications facilities-roads, air fields, wharves, 
telephones, etc.; its factories, workshops, and stores; and its numerous other 
substantial buildings, public and private. 
Published statistics on expatriate-owned plantations are more reliable than 
those on indigenous ones, but even the former are somewhat out of date. The 
latest published figures (for 1974-75) stated that there were 15,000 hectares of 
expatriate plantations planted in coconuts and cocoa (out of a total of 27,000 
hectares contained in the 58 holdings listed). Clearly, these large areas of 
producing trees constitute a huge investment in equipment and labor, one that 
produced in 1974-75 13,841 tons of copra and 5,732 tons of dried cocoa beans. 
The question as to what economic benefits the BougainviHians themselves 
derive from these expatriate-owned enterprises is difficult to answer. Prior to 
World War II hundreds of Bougainvillians earned wages from them but that is no 
longer the case, since most of the plantations' laborers are now mainland 
Niuginians. Some of the tax money generated by the plantations finds its way back 
to the Province in the form of Administration-dispensed goods and services. In 
addition, Bougainvillians receive some indirect economic benefits from these 
expatriate enterprises, such as use of plantation roads, and time-saving access to 
plantation trade-stores. 
Statistics on Bougainvillian-owned cash-crop acreages and production do 
exist, but anyone who has observed at first hand how such statistics are collected 
will be highly skeptical of their accuracy. However, in the absence of anything 
better, the PNG Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries Report for 1969-
70 (Indigenous Crop and Cattle Statistics No.4) gives the following figures for 
indigenous smallholders (who were, presumably, mostly native BougainviHians): 
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Area under coconuts 20,017 hectares 
" " cocoa 8,103 " 
" " coffee and rubber 214 " 
Production: copra 8,696 tons 
" cocoa 2,030 " 
( Production figures for coffee and rubber are not given) 
Tree-counting would provide more useful figures-if the age and productivity of 
the trees were also specified (which is not the case for the Province as a whole). 
Also, the above figures on production do not give the whole story, inasmuch as 
some of the Province's cash-crop production escapes recording as such, through 
direct individual sales to buyers elsewhere. 
It should be added that, whatever figure is arrived at for the total or per 
capita value of this resource, that figure needs to reflect the cost of maintaining 
the cash-crop trees in full production--costs in terms of equipment and labor, 
particularly, unpaid family labor. In most cases that I know about the 
Bougainvillian owner is well aware of the amount of work involved in keeping his 
plantations in good order but does not consciously and quantitatively discount that 
kind of cost when calculating the long-term economic value of his plantations. 
Another large and economically valuable resource owned by Bougainvillians 
consists of their food-growing lands. The food crops currently growing constitute 
only a very short-term asset, inasmuch as the kinds of vegetables and fruit being 
grown have no storage life to speak of. (Compare in this respect Bougainvillians' 
sweet potatoes and, say, pawpaws, with the tangible, resource value of rice and 
wheat stored in warehouses.) In long-term perspective, what is economically most 
valuable about the Bougainvillians' gardening is the large amount of land that has 
been transformed over time from virgin forest to gardenable condition. According 
to the CSIRO survey of 1962, about 1050 square miles, or 30 percent of the Islands' 
total land area, had "anthropogenous" vegetation-i.e., showed signs of having been 
used for cultivation within the past eight to ten decades. (The same survey put the 
amount of land devoted to current indigenous gardening and cash-cropping at 163 
square miles, or 5 percent of the Islands' total area.) 
Clearing the Province's primary forest areas is very costly in terms of labor, 
even when employed with modern equipment. (What it was like to clear with stone 
26 
tools, with which the original clearing was accomplished, is hard to imagine!) Even 
the secondary vegetation is difficult to clear, since local gardening techniques 
involve lengthy fallowing periods and hence advanced secondary vegetation, but 
that is nothing compared to the amount of labor that has gone into clearing the 
original primary forest. Hence, in adding up the Province's economic assets one 
must include this important labor investment. As will be shown below, the amount 
of land that will be needed in the future to sustain Bougainvillians economically 
will far exceed the 1,050 square miles classed as "anthropogenous" in the CSIRO 
survey. 
In order to appreciate the magnitude of this asset, in monetary terms, the 
reader may find it instructive to calculate what the current cost would be, both 
with and without mechanical equipment, of clearing this amount of primary forest. 
Turning now to the Province's other noteworthy man-made material 
resources-its roads, airfields, and port facilities-many readers of this report are 
far better informed than I am concerning the amount of money spent so far in 
building and maintaining these assets. I wish only to emphasize the fact that, under 
the climatic conditions that prevail, all of these assets will become useless in a 
very short time without regular maintenance. And, as is well known, the 
maintenance of such facilities is an already costly exercise that will become 
increasingly so in the future. 
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5. Self-Sufficiency 
The question now to be faced is: What are the long-range prospects for 
Bougainvillians being able to satisfy their material needs and wants-in view of 
their rapidly increasing numbers, their economically relevant attitudes and skills, 
their growing appetites for imported goods and costly services-all of which must 
be considered in terms of the finite nature of their natural and man-made 
resources. 
First of all, some (but not all) Bougainvillians should be able to satisfy all of 
their food needs and many of their food wants by continuation of their traditional 
subsistence activities. 
Now that the change-over from taro to sweet potato has been nearly 
universally accepted and accomplished the crisis precipitated by the postwar taro 
blight no longer threatens. There remains some room for introduction of new food 
plants and for encouragement of more attention to diet balancing, but the 
technology of root crop gardening is being efficiently pursued-as 'efficiently' as 
the present long-fallow system of planting permits. And taking the Province as a 
whole there appears to be enough arable land, both "anthropogenous" and still 
untouched, to meet food growing requirements for a generation or more to come, 
even for the increasing population, and even under the present long-fallow 
system-provided no more land is transferred to cash cropping or other land-
intensive uses. Unfortunately, even under these (unlikely) provisos, the location of 
such land is not sufficiently matched with the people who will be requiring it. 
Moreover, there are some other constraints that impede people's use of gardening 
land even if they reside nearby. 
Regarding the first of those constraints, there are some places (e.g., Aita) 
where the population is small and scattered and where suitable land (both 
anthropogenous and arable primary forest) is found in large enough quantities to 
meet local gardeners' needs for decades to come, proportionate even to predictable 
natural increases in the local population. In contrast, there are other areas (e.g., 
southwest Nagovisi) where the denser-and very rapidly increasing local-popula-
tion is already beginning to run out of suitable land for gardening (a predicament 
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that has been hastened by transformation of garden land into cocoa). One "logical" 
solution to this disparity would be to encourage land-poor people to migrate, 'to 
land-abundant areas-· -but for many BougainviUians that is easier said than .done. 
On the one hand, while many Bougainvillians appear willing to,movefrom their 
villages to urban areas (when gardening is not at issue), moves of whole families 
from home villages to other populated villages where kin ties are tenuous or 
altogether lacking, are infrequent and usually objectionable to both parties. For 
such migrants this kind of move entails the attenuation of social ties with familiar 
kinfolk and neighbors, and loss of those feelings of security that are, derived from 
proximity to ancestor-linked land. (Similar losses are incurred when people move 
permanently into the towns, but in such cases there are compensations, material 
and social, without equivalents in village life.) 
Migrants to distant villages are even more disadvantaged with respect to 
land; for, no matter how abundant the land may be in the destination village area" 
it wi1l be found to be already owned. Traditionally, Bougainvillians were usually 
most generous in allowing one another to garden, more or less freely, on their own 
land; and this commendable custom still prevails in areas where land is relatively 
·abundant. Lending land for cash-cropping is however a different matter. For one 
thing, cash crops generate money, and therefore-it is reasoned-ought to require 
rent in the form of money. Again, whereas garden crops last only a. year or two 
from planting to harvest, cocoa and coconuts pre-empt. their sites for very long 
times. (Under the system of long-fallowing that governs it, root-crop gardening 
also pre-empts a site for many years after the crop is harvested, but not as long as 
cash..;cropping-and in any case Bougainvillians do not seem to attach much weight 
to' this factor when lending land for food gardening.) Thus, while immigrants may, 
experience no difficulty in their new homes in borrowi~g land for food-gardening, 
they' will most likely find it more difficult and costly to purchase or lease land for 
cash-cropping there. 
The situation just described prevails mainly on Buka, along BOtJgainvill~'s 
northern and eastern coasts, in the Nasioi-speaking areas and throughout so~thern ' 
Bougainville. Other peoples-including the Eivos, Aitas, Rotokas, Keriaka" and 
Konua, who in recent decades have moved from their ancestral lands to places 
nearer or more accessible to the coast (mainly in order to engage in cash-cropping) 
could return to their now uninhabited ancestral domains if survival depended upon 
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it, but this would entail a return to a wholly "traditional" standard of living tnat 
few contemporary Bougainvillians would care to revert to-notwithstanding some 
of the current. political slogans extolling that way of life. 
Traditionally, Bougainvillians supplemented their cuitivated food plants with 
wild ot semi-wild ones: sago,canarium almonds, ferns, fungi, inu;hrooms, etc. In 
most areas they still do so, although these plants constitute a small fraction of 
total food consumed. In fact, as more'andinore stor'e-bought foods are eaten there 
wIll be a corresponding decrease in consumption of wild foods, although as long as 
trad~tionaJ feasting' continues there wilI perhaps be a demand for sago and 
almonds-in many places even' surpassing' the supply, in" ~riew of the Islands' 
increasing population and df the more or lt~ss fixed number of trees likely to be 
available. 
Coconuts will undoubtedly continue' to be desired for food and drink for 
decades to come, and in rural areas there appears to be little likelihood of 
shortages. Even foreseeable urban'demand for edible coconuts could be' satisfied 
fora long time to come, given proper transport and marketing facilities. However, 
the Province's present stands of palms will eventually 'age past bearing, so that 
systematic new planting will' be required to supply demands of an increasing 
population. Moreover, it IS conceivable that a time will come when, in the' absence 
of bther money sources, Bougainvillians may b~ moved to forgo eating this 
nutritionally valuable food in order to corwert all of it into money, via copra-' a 
. , 
development that has already taken place in some other Pacific communities. 
For anyone familiar with prewar BougainvillE,:l it is difficult to conceive of 
. • : ' , '.' I 
rural life there without pigs. These affable beasts did not, constitute a large part of 
their owners' daily diet but as one, of the few available sources of animal protein 
they were important nutr~tionally. AI;Id they were, ~nd in some places continue to 
be, almost indispensable for some of the most admirable, enjoyable, and socially 
jntegrative aspects of Bouga,invillian culture, such as feasting, respect..,showing, 
marriage'-making, and the maintenance of cooperative kin ties. Unfortunately, in 
many places pigs have now become so scarce relative to demand and so costly to 
purchase that they are becoming a diminishing asset' both nutritionally and 
c;ul turally. 
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Home-grown beef, chickens and eggs have never figured importantly in rural 
diets, and are not likely to do so in the foreseeable future. However, as is well 
known, efforts have been made in recent years to encourage their production for 
sale-an enterprise that will be considered in a later section of this report. 
Compared with the Papua New Guinea mainland, Bougainville contains fewer 
species of wild fauna, and none of them plays a large role in economic life. Wild 
pigs and opossums continue to be hunted throughout the Islands but, it would seem, 
more for sport or ceremonial uses than for food. Nevertheless, these animals do 
provide an occasional protein supplement and are thus to be considered a useful 
native resource-and one likely to diminish at present rates of depletion. Similar 
generalizations apply to Bougainville's birds and flying foxes, which add more color 
to the forests than food to indigenes' meals. 
Reference was made earlier to the possibilities of developing a large-scale 
fishing industry in the Province's off-shore waters. A question may also be asked 
about the economic actualities and possibilities of the Islands' inshore and 
freshwater marine resources. 
There can be no doubt about the benefits of locally-caught marine products 
to the diets of many of the Province's shore dwellers, and some of these 
latter-e.g., in Teop-obtain money and other kinds of foods by exchanging some of 
their fish with inlanders. Some inlanders elsewhere would also claim that they 
obtain large quantities of fish from their rivers (as BCL compensation negotiations 
have discovered!), but there are also other places where freshwater fish are either 
too scarce, or fishing activities too desultory, to provide much of this source of 
valuable animal protein. Still, the streams and ponds are there, and should be 
surveyed by experts with a view to periodic stocking with edible fish, etc. to 
supplement local diets and reduce the costly dependence on tinned fish. 
In the distant past the Province's forests supplied all of the materials used 
for construction of dwellings and other indigenous buildings-clubhouses, pig pens, 
etc. Currently, however, imported materials are used preponderant or almost 
exclusively in many 'public' structures, and Bougainvillians are also using such 
materials more and more for their own dewe1lings. Such is the trend and such it is 
likely to continue-so long as money continues to be available for purchasing those 
imports. Unlike food, however, Bougainvillians could shelter themselves quite 
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adequately for generations to come by reverting to dependence upon local building 
materials. Given the rate of population increase and the trend to cash-cropping 
there will not be sufficient land, in the right location, to permit future generations 
to feed themselves wholly from their own gardens, but they could shelter 
themselves for many more generations by using materials from their own 
forests-if they choose to do so. 
As with their newly acquired food wants, however, it is extremely unlikely 
that Bougainvillians will revert contentedly to wholly traditional types of shelter, 
hence money will be needed to satisfy this along with their wants for other kinds of 
costly goods and services. With this in mind we turn now to consideration of the 
means available to Bougainvillians to acquire the money they need to satisfy their 
recently acquired material wants. 
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6. Money through Expropriation 
Several Bougainvillians have asserted to me that 'all profits from outsider-
owned enterprises ought to be divided among all Bougainvililans.' Some of these 
opinions came from university-trained youths and were phrased in sophisticated 
political dogma, but most of them came from individuals expressing an 
unelaborated but deeply-felt conviction that all such enterprises belonged rightly 
and exclusively to Bougainvil1lans-regardless of the outside capital and energy 
that had been invested in them. 
In view of these convictions, which I imagine to be fairly widespread, it may 
be pertinent to speculate about the magnitude of such a redistribution, should it 
ever eventuate. In other words, to what extent would Bougainvilllans be able to 
satisfy their present and future money needs if all of the revenues from outsider-
owned enterprises over and above direct operation costs were to be shared among 
themselves, exclusively, on an equal per capita basis? (One assumption underlying 
this exercise is that the Central Government would consent to the arrangement; 
another that the enterprises would continue to operate at current rates of 
"profit"-I leave it to others to judge whether these assumptions are realistic!) 
Needless to say, estimating such "profits" involves a host of uncertainties 
and extrapolations-but let us at least try, and base our calculations on what 
figures there are available on costs and revenues during the last fully reported 
years. 
The figures on BCL are the most detailed and readlly accessible-a special 
boon to our exercise, since these figures constitute the overwhelmingly largest part 
of all outsider-owned profits earned in the Province. 
According to the Company's Annual Report for 1976 the net earnings for 
that year were K61,670,OOO. Of this amount K20,303,OOO was paid out in taxes to 
the Papua New Guinea Government, and K26,738,OOO in dividends to shareholders. 
Assuming that all of the net earnings (before taxes and dividends) were distributed 
equally among all Bougainvlllians alive at the end of 1976-an estimated 
lOO,OOO-this would provide each of the latter with a sum of about K617. 
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Such a distribution of Company earnings would of course not only deprive 
the P.N.G. Government-and through it the North Solomons Provincial Government 
and the Central Government's other agencies in the Province--of its K20,303,000 
tax revenues, but by paying no dividends it would deprive the P.N.G. Government 
and PNG Investment Corporation of K5,347,500, which represented their share of 
those dividends. (It would also deprive Bougainvillian shareholders of their dividend 
incomes-how much I do not know.) 
Turning to the Province'S non-indigenous rural holdings, the most recent 
published data obtainable cover the year ended 30th June, 1974.* During that year 
the holdings in question numbered sixty-eight, and employed 4,475 persons, of 
whom 4,405 were indigenes and principally mainland Papua Niuginians. The total 
value of produce for the year was about Kll,819,OOO, and total estimated costs 
about K2,907,000 (labor, operations, construction), resulting in a gross "profit" of 
about K8,912,000. According to Bedford, who calculated these estimates (based on 
data published by the Papua New Guinea Bureau of Statistics, these "profits" seem 
very high, but-as he points out-' -the period in question was one of high prices for 
both copra and cocoa. 
Comparable data on the Province's secondary industries (which, for the 
period in question, were mainly non-indigenous in ownership) cover the year ended 
30 June 1975. 
The thirty-five "factories"** listed employed a total of 1,186 persons and 
produced goods and services worth K 11 ,596,000. The gross profits from these 
"factories" are not stated, but may be estimated by subtracting from the above 
figure the reported costs of all wages (i.e., K4,393,000) and of all power and 
materials used in production (i.e., K5,374,OOO). The resulting figure, K829,OOO, 
evidently does not reflect the additional costs of depreciation, insurance, etc. (nor 
does the comparable estimate given above for the rural industries). If these 
*The "Preliminary statement" on Rural Industries issued by the PNG Bureau 
of Statistics for the year ended 30th June 1975 does not provide enough data to 
permit estimation of "profits," hence our lise of the previous year's figures. 
,'H'cA "factory" being defined as ". . .any establishment engaged in 
manufacturing, repairing, assembling, preparing, treating, or making up any article 
or substance and in which four or more persons are employed, or where power 
(other than manual) is used.!! 
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additional costs are subtracted, at an estimated rate of 3 percent of gross profits, 
the resulting profits (before taxes) would amount to about K8,645,OOO (for the rural 
industries) and K204,OOO (for the secondary industries). 
I am unable to provide comparable estimates of profits for other kinds of 
non-indigenous commercial establishments located in the Province (e.g., retail, 
transport, stevedoring), but the ones just given are sufficient for the purpose of this 
rough exercise. 
Summarizing the foregoing, recent annual profits (before tax) of the 
Province's three most important types of non-indigenous money-earning enterprises 
total about K70,5l9,OOO. If this sum were to be divided equally among all 
Bougainvillians alive at the end of 1 977--conservati vely an estimated lOO,OOO-the 
share per person would be about K705.-a tidy windfall indeed for a population 
whose average annual money income would probably come to less than one-tenth of 
that amount,* but hardly approaching the vast sums that some Bougainvillians 
envisage in their fantasies. Also, if the recipients would wish to continue to 
receive the benefits they now receive free or at a low cost to themselves-e.g., 
education, health care, use of roads, governmental technical services, police, 
defense, etc.-the costs of these, it is logical to assume, would have to come out of 
that windfall in the form of taxes or of direct pay-for-use, thereby leaving a 
residue of no more than about K460 per capita per annum. (This figure is based on 
an assumption that the Central Government spends about K24,500,OOO per annum 
on the Province, either in the form of direct costs and grants, or of per capita 
distributions of nation-wide costs for Defense, Health, tertiary education, 
Administration, Communications, etc.) 
But that would be only now. In view of the population's natural rate of 
increase, and assuming that the cost of public services will continue to increase and 
the profits in question remain about the same, the net share per capita per annum 
would be less than about K250, twenty years hence, and would become 
proportionately smaller in time. 
*This estimate of course is nothing more than a impressimistically based 
guess. A few figures are at hand giving money income average for small 
components of the indigenous Bougainvlllian popUlation-e.g. from wages, cash-
crops, compensation payments, vegetable sales, etc.-but these are not numerous 
enough to provide credible Province-wide statistics. 
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To appreciate the significance (or rather, insignificance) of these sums they 
should be compared with estimates of the current costs of feeding Bougainvillians 
on a diet of imported food. That figure (which will be discussed in a later section) 
comes to about $150 per annum on the basis of food costs in 1970. At recent rates 
of inflation these costs would have about doubled by the end of 1977, and will reach 
about K3000 twenty years from now! Such figures are of course meaningless unless 
account is also taken of inflation in the prices for copper, gold, copra and 
cocoa-and hence in the 'profit' to be redistributed from the expropriated 
enterprises. Historically, however, the price increases in the latter have not kept 
pace with those of imported goods, including foods, so that it is not safe to assume 
that they will do so in the future. 
Thus, while the expropriation, "provincialization," and universal sharing of 
money earned by outsider-owned enterprises would serve to feed all Bougainvillians 
with imported foods for a few years to come, it would not continue to do so for 
very long-and would be quite insufficient even in the near future to provide 
Bougainvillians with all the other imported goods and services they have come to 
want and depend upon. Clearly, even with expropr ia tion, Bougainv illians would 
have to find other ways, old or new, for obtaining the money they need or want. 
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7. Money from Compensation 
In recent years numbers of BougainvilJians have obtained money through 
"compensation"-sums paid to individuals and kin groups by BCL to recompense 
them for loss of land, buildings, economically valuable trees and crops, fish, 
tranquility, etc. The history and the magnitude of these transactions, through 
1974, have been described in detail in Compensating for Development, by Richard 
Bedford and Alexander Mamak. The main points of the study that relate to the 
principal concern of this report are the following: 
By the end of 1974 BCL had paid some 1,500 persons a total of $1.8 million in 
compensation (not including the costs of resettling several villages, and exclusive 
of the occupying costs at Arawa and Loloho). These payments were of two kinds: 
lump-sum and annual occupation rents. 
Of the 1,000 individuals whose payments were reviewed in the Bedford-
Mamak study (comprising a total of about $1.6 million in payments) only three 
percent received over $10,000 each, and less than one-third received over $1,000 
each. In fact, the median amount received by individuals over the period 1966-74 
was only $244. 
The recipients of the $1.6 million payments recorded by Bedford and Mamak 
were residents of 62 villages-a very small percentage of the Province's total 
number of villages. The total amounts received in those 62 villages varied widely. 
One of them (i.e., Jaba) receives about $50,000 per annum in occupation fees, but 
about half of all the recipient villages each received $10,000 or less throughout the 
period 1966-74. 
Since 1974 the number of individuals and communities receiving compensa-
tion from BCL has increased, and will probably continue to do so-Bedford and 
Mamak estimated the resident population eligible for compensation, directly or 
indirectly, to be about 4,000. However, even this larger total constitutes less than 
five percent of the Province's total present population. Moreover, it is estimated 
that only a small part of the amounts thus far received in compensation payments 
have been invested in ways that will produce future incomes to the recipients or 
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their heirs, the rest having been spent on consumer goods and expendable capital 
goods like trucks. 
Among the more durable forms of compensation payments are occupation 
fees, some of which will continue throughout the life of the mine. However, only a 
very small percentage of Bougainvillians will be receiving this kind of monetary 
benefit, and only a few of these will receive enough to satisfy all the money needs 
they can be expected to experience and voice. 
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8. "Work" versus "Cargo" 
In one sense the windfall exemplified by the kind of expropriation and 
redistribution just considered is akin to the belief in "Cargo," which has surfaced in 
these islands in various places from time to time. 
Kago, the Melanesian genre of a world-wide cultural phenomenon, has 
materialized in the Province in many versions, but its common, underlying 
theme-indeed, its definitive characteristic-is a belief (and practices based on 
that belief) in the efficacy of supernatural assistance for the acquisition of 
material goods. Elements of the theme are of course age-old, as for example the 
use of magic to make crops grow and fish bite. For the last six or seven decades, 
however, imported manufactured goods have largely replaced indigenous ones on 
the lists of the things desired, and bits of Christian dogma and ritual have been 
added to the mix-plus, in some instances, various social and political goals. 
On Bougainville manifestations of kago have ranged from large-scale 
politically militant movements, to small clandestine cults. And the mixture of 
logics involved in their dogmas have varied between total dependence upon 
supernatural agents, to heavy reliance on hard work (merely supplemented by 
expectations of supernatural assistance). The question is: To what extent are 
Bougainvillians of the future likely to depend upon the supernatural agencies of 
kago, rather than productive or entrepreneurial or wage-earning work, to obtain the 
money they want? 
On the basis of research reports of others, supplemented by personal 
observations, I have the impression that kago thinking still prevails in the minds of 
a great many Bougainvillians and that it will continue to do so for a long time to 
come-until Bougainvillians have learned and assimilated the hard realities 
attending their involvement in a world-wide exchange economy. The roots of this 
thinking, as just noted, can be traced to the past, but I think it must be recognized, 
however unpalatable the charge may be, that kago thinking has been encouraged 
during the past decade by politically motivated promises, official and otherwise, 
that the "kago will arrive" once some desired political change takes place. First it 
was "independence," then "secessionism," then "provincial government," then the 
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voting-into-office of some candidate or another. Even in societies with totally 
literate, historically sophisticated, and market-wise citizenries, some of this kind 
of utopian thinking persists, thereby affording opportunities to politicians, sincere 
and otherwise, to maintain or win office; hence it is no wonder that Bougainvillians 
are susceptible to it. 
On the other hand, I have also formed an impression that most present-day 
Bougainvillians recognize that all the money they want will not fall from Heaven, 
or be induced into being by ancestors' bones, or appear out of the blue upon the 
establishment of some new political order, without some practical, mundane work 
on their part. So, let us turn now to the several kinds of money-earning 
occupations in which Bougainvillians are now engaged, and enquire about the 
potentialities they offer for providing Bougainvillians with the money they want. 
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9. Working for Wages 
To recapitulate a well-known slice of history, Bougainvillians began working 
for wages more than a century ago. 
In the beginning, especially, and even up to 1945, there was an element of 
coercion in the recruitment of laborers for such work. For example, the head tax 
system had the effect, if not perhaps the declared official intention, of forcing 
many men to work for wages inasmuch as they had no other way of earning money 
for the mandatory head tax. This kind of interpretation could be extended even to 
some present-day situation-i.e., to the degree that school fees must be paid-but 
many present-day Bougainvillians appear to choose wage-earning as a desirable way 
of acquiring money--or even as a preferred way of life. 
In any case, whatever the reason may be for engaging in it, wage-earning 
provides a large source of money for present-day Bougainvillians, and it will 
continue to do so in the foreseeable future. 
Prior to World War II the principal, almost the only, occupation in which 
Bougainvillians served was that of unskilled plantation laborer. In 1939 some 3,400 
were thus employed-i.e., almost ten percent of the whole population; and of those 
about 900 were employed outside the District (as it then was). At that time the 
modal wage was six shillings a month, plus shelter, food, bedding, laplaps, soap, and 
tobacco. After World War II plantation wages were increased somewhat, but few 
Bougainvillians returned to such work, in the District or elsewhere. Receipt of 
large sums of war casualty compensation-about eight pounds (Australian) per 
capita-may have contributed to this reluctance, but perhaps a more potent reason 
was the near-universal discontent with plantation living and working conditions, 
including long-term employment. 
In consequence of these sentiments relatively few Bougainvillians were 
engaged in wage-earning activities until the middle of the 'sixties, there having 
been few wage-earning jobs locally available, except on plantations (which were by 
that time importing nearly all of their labor from the Mainland). Store-tending, 
stevedoring, and desultory public-works programs provided some jobs, and some 
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Bougainvillians worked on weekly or daily time bases for nearby Missions and 
expatriate plantations, etc. A few even worked for other Bougainvillians in the 
latters' plantations-although there seems to have been a widespread reluctance to 
employ or be employed by fellow-villagers for money. 
The District-wide volume of wage.,.earning throughout the early postwar era 
cannot be reconstructed now. It must, however, have varied widely from place to 
place, according to proximity to Missions and to such centers as Buka Passage and 
Kieta. One indication of the scope of it is provided by Ogan, who carried out 
research in the Aropa valley in the early 'sixties: 
In general, men in the sample villages worked for wages on a short-
term basis only. Of the 20 able-bodied Rumba men between the ages 
of 17 and 50 with whom I had most contact, only one was employed 
(at the sawmill) for most of the fieldwork period. [A total of four 
young men worked for me as cook-domestic servant. Only one 
worked for more than five months, and his eleven-month stint was 
broken in the middle by my trip to Australia. ] Three others held 
jobs for periods of three to six months at a time, while 15 had casual 
jobs lasting not more than one or two months at a time-sometimes 
only a week elapsing before they were fired. Ten of these men had as 
their longest job experience during 1962-64 a five-week stint 
maintaining the airstrip, supervised by a Buin man who had married 
locally. This job, although paid by the government, was in its daily 
routine like working for a fellow villager. Thus it could reasonably be 
said that villagers avoided work for Europeans. (Ogan 1972:142) 
A t that time wages ranged from sixty to eighty cents a day, "bosbois" having 
received somewhat more. 
Some men in Ogan's sample villages also employed or worked for other 
Bougainvillians, at somewhat lower and less consistent wage rates than those cited 
above. 
Aropa's proximity to Kieta and the airfield probably made it a higher-than-
average area in terms of wage~employment, much more active than areas like Aita 
and Eivo and Guava, where opportunities for wage work scarcely existed. 
The late 'sixties, of course, witnessed a huge increase in wage-earning for 
the District as a whole, beginning with the mine exploration phase. At the peak of 
construction, in 1970-71, Bougainville Copper and its contractors employed over 
6,300 indigenes, about 30 percent of them Bougainvillans. In 1974 this dropped to 
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about 4,500 indigenes for the project as a whole, and the numbers of wage-workers 
decreased sharply and fairly regularly thereafter. 
A t the start of the construction phase of the mine there were not enough 
Bougainvillian job applicants to fill the urgent demand, and laborers were brought 
in from the Mainland in large numbers. With the decrease in demand, however, 
hundreds of Bougainvillians who sought jobs with the project were rejected-e.g., 
between April and September 1971, 30 percent of the 1,300 Bougainvillian job 
applicants were turned down. 
During the first eight months of 1974 BCL employed 749 
indigenes-including 289 Bougainvillians, but there continued to be more applicants 
than jobs (e.g., of the 209 Bougainvillians who applied for jobs during January-April 
1974 only 108 could be employed). 
I do not have precise figures on job applications and acceptances for the 
years since 1974 but it is quite clear that throughout this period the number of 
applicants has exceeded the number of job openings on the mine project by a 
sizable margin. This has quite understandingly led many Bougainvillians to demand 
that non-Bougainvillians be excluded from the work force (competition for jobs has 
not, of course, been the only cause for such sentiment). While BCL has 
not-probably cannot-agree to this demand, the company does appear to have 
favored, heavily, Bougainvillian applicants in recent years. But even if only 
Bougainvillians were to be employed on the mine project, there would probably be 
more applicants than jobs. In other words, however dim a view Bougainvillians may 
have of BCL's presence on their Island, and however unfavorably they may look 
upon employment with BCL, compared with other kinds of wage-earning jobs, their 
desire for money will continue to persuade them to seek jobs with the Company in 
numbers exceeding the jobs. 
Another manifestation of the economic differences that prevail between the 
Province's several geographic regions is found in BCL employment figures. Since 
these differences have been described in some detail in the publications of Moulik 
and of Bedford and Mamak, only the most relevant high-points will be mentioned 
here, namely: 
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--Residents of the Buin sub-District have consistently outnumbered those 
of Kieta and Buka on the Company work force 
--Residents of Buka tend to stay with the Company longer than those of 
Buin and Kieta, and to work in higher-paying jobs. 
Several circumstances seem to account for these differences (e.g., the Kietas' 
easier access to other wage-earning jobs; the Bukas'. higher education levels and 
their farther distance from home), and these differences will probably continue to 
prevail for a while, thereby reinforcing the several other circumstances that serve 
to differentiate the Province's various regions both economically and socially, and 
perhaps politically as well-a point that will be returned to later in this report. 
BCL is by all odds the Province'S largest employer of Bougainvillians but it is 
not the only significant one. The difficulty for most of the Province's wage-job 
seekers lies in the fact that most of these other jobs are also concentrated in the 
Kieta-Arawa area. Kietas living in or near this area are able to reside at home and 
commute to work, which large numbers of them do; but except for those few whose 
employers provide housing and subsistence, all others must pay a high price for 
housing and feeding themselves near their jobs. -- Here again, therefore, the 
concentration of the Province'S wage-earning jobs in one area serves to widen even 
further the differences among its various regions with respect to money 
income-and all the consequences thereof. 
As will be described, not all Bougainvillians want or need wage-earning jobs, 
but regarding those who do-and these will probably continue to outnumber job-
openings-it is relevant to this report to enquire about the kinds of jobs they 
prefer-or will accept. Answers to this enquiry are not available for the whole of 
the Province, or for all age groups, but Moulik's study provides some clues about 
the job preferences and aspirations of an important segment of the population. 
The study in question was based on a survey of the opinions of 596 male and 
female secondary school students, 277 from the Kieta sub-District and 319 from 
Buin. The students were asked these substantive questions: 
1. How they ranked, in terms of respect (from "very highly respected" to 
"held in every low respect"), the twenty-six occupations available to most school-
leavers of Papua New Guinea. 
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2. Which of the fourteen kinds of jobs most readily available to them they 
would prefer to have. 
3. Which of those fourteen jobs they actual1y expected to obtain. In 
answer to the first question the most prestigious occupations in their views were: 
doctor, political leader, priest, police, teacher, mechanic, and positions in Army, 
Navy, or Air Force (including commercial airplane work). At the bottom were: 
vil1age gardener, painter, driver, cook/houseboy, and plantation laborer. ("Vil1age 
gardener" was differentiated from "cash-crop farmer," which placed somewhat 
higher in their ranking.) 
In the listing of preferred occupations (as contrasted with those considered 
most prestigious) "teacher," "mechanic," "doctor," "government officer," "nurse," 
and "clerk-typist" placed highest; while "engineer-scientist," "BCP job," "political 
leader ," "police," and "store assistant" placed lowest. (Note that while "political 
leader" and "police" were considered to be highly prestigious by the students, few 
of them aspired to hold such jobs.) 
In their listing of expected jobs most of the students questioned appear to 
have either raised or lowered their aspirations in terms of their current 
infor:mation, or misinformation, about economic and social realities. For example, 
while many of them preferred to be doctors, few expected that they would in fact 
become doctors. And while many said they aspired no higher than to such low-
prestige jobs as farming, several of those said they actual1y exptected to obtain 
jobs that they considered to be higher in prestige. 
Moulik's study also revealed some significant differences between Kieta and 
Buin students in the matter of job preferences and expectations. Those from Buin, 
for example, were generally more ambitious than their Kieta counterparts-a 
reflection perhaps of the latters' closer exposure to the realities of the job market. 
This and other differences between the responses of the two sub-Province samples 
suggests that corresponding or even wider differences in job preferences and 
expectations would be discovered if similar studies were conducted in other parts 
of the Province. 
The students were also asked by Moulik about their expected incomes from 
the jobs they aspired to. Although their answers revealed a large measure of 
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ignorance about existing wage rates, they did indicate a strong preference for what 
the students perceived to be the higher-income jobs. Moreover, this finding was 
reinforced by the specific reasons given by the students for choosing the jobs they 
chose-i.e., "to make a lot of money" placed second only to "to be helpful to 
others," and above "to be able to increase knowledge and give new ideas" and all 
other reasons. 
The most pertinent conclusion to be drawn from all the above is that wage-
earning has become an acceptable temporary way of life for many Bougainvillians, 
and an acceptable permanent way of life for many others, particularly for the 
better educated ones, whose numbers will increase if present trends continue to 
prevail. The question is: Will there be enough jobs?-either to satisfy occupational 
aspirations now being generated or, more critically, to provide incomes for those 
who will have no other ways of obtaining the money needed to satisfy basic 
material needs and wants? 
Even a cursory examination of present job opportunities, and of credible job-
generating programs now underway or being planned, suggests that the answer to 
the above question is negative. I will return to this question later on in this report, 
but before considering the other ways in which Bougainvillians now obtain, or might 
obtain, the money they need and want, some mention should be made of the 
commitments Bougainvillian wage-earners evidently make towards their jobs, and 
the place their jobs occupy in their lives. 
It would appear from employment records that Bougainvillians in general are 
more interested in seeking higher wages than in the kinds of "job satisfactions" that 
some workers elsewhere derive from mastery of particular skills. Not only do most 
Bougainvillians, if given the chance, change jobs quite frequently, and mainly for 
higher wages, but a large proportion of such wage-earners voluntarily and 
recurrently leave their jobs to return to their villages-to harvest cash crops, plant 
gardens, "save money," visit kinfolk, etc. And while these actions are in a sense 
marks of the personal freedom they enjoy, and while periodic return to village life 
and rural productive activities may be desirable in some ways, the effects of these 
practices are costly both to the employers and, in some important ways, to the 
workers themselves. For, while such on-again, off-again wage-earners may obtain 
higher incomes while job opportunities last, or while rural cash-cropping remains 
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profitable and practicable, such wage-earners will become competitively disadvan-
taged in the job market, particularly with respect to higher-paying jobs, should the 
possibilities of pursuing those alternatives decrease. 
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10. Cash-Cropping 
The growing of plant products for sale engages more Bougainvillians than 
any other money-earning enterprise and it produces in aggregate the largest money 
income. This section of the report will summarize some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of that cash-cropping and will raise questions about its place in the 
economic future of the Province. 
Bougainville's climate and much of its soil are evidently very favorable for 
the growing of coconuts and cocoa. With respect to climate there are some 
regional differences--e.g., some experts blame the relatively inferior coconuts 
grown in the Buin Plain on that area's greater cloudiness-but except in the higher 
altitudes climate is not the weightiest factor that influences cash-cropping's degree 
of success. Regional differences in soil and other surface features are weightier: 
there are several extensive areas--e.g., the 200 or so square miles of poorly-
drained (so-called "Silibai" land type) areas of southern and western 
Bougainville-that are ill-suited to tree crops, and still others-the 363 square 
miles designated as Class VII lands in the CSIRO report--described as being 
unsuitable for any commercial land use. It must not be concluded from this, 
however, that all the rest of Bougainville's area (i.e., some 2 900 square miles) is 
ideally suited to cash-cropping; factors of topography, etc. would reduce that 
figure considerably. But if there were no other inhibiting circumstances to limit 
cash-cropping in the Province there is no question but that there is suitable land 
enough to accommodate much additional planting in years to come. 
Unfortunately, the limiting factors are numerous. Beginning with copra, 
Bougainvillians have been selling copra for a century or more-first to visiting 
traders and then to locally-based trade stores. Also, they became laborers on 
expatriate plantations located on Bougainville and elsewhere-that is, until World 
War II, since which time few Bougainvillians have been willing to engage in this 
kind of onerous and generally low-wage work. Parallel with these developments, 
many Bougainvillians have established plantations of their own, either as individual 
or cooperative ventures; and in some parts of the Province, mainly on Buka and 
along the east and north coasts of the larger island, copra is the principal source of 
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money for the indigenous cash-croppers. Elsewhere copra production has not 
flourished as well, due either to local growing conditions or to transport 
difficulties, or both. But even where copra production is a principal, or the 
principal, indigenous money-earning activity it seems to be impeded by natural or 
human obstacles-mainly the latter. 
Generally speaking, pests and diseases are not as devastating in the Province as 
they are in some other nearby islands (e.g., on New Ireland, where the Asiatic rhino 
bettIe was introduced about 1942, or on Goodenough Island, where coconut palms 
were completely defoliated in 1966 by migratory locusts). However, the poor 
ground maintenance that characterizes many if not most indigenous plantations 
encourages pests and diseases that reduce yields, and the same poor ground 
maintenance makes it more difficult and time-consuming to collect the fallen nuts. 
Throughout most of the Province the quantity and quality of indigenously 
produced copra fall short of potentialities, and this is due to several widespread 
human-made causes. 
In most places seed nuts are taken at random, without any selection for quality. 
Nor do many planters take the trouble to establish seedling nurseries (a practice 
that would serve not only to protect the vulnerable new palms but also to ensure 
that only healthy seedlings be planted). Most planters appear to understand the 
need for proper spacing but few indigenous plantations are so spaced: in some the 
palms are too close together for healthy growth, in others farther apart than 
necessary-and hence wasteful of land. Most indigenous plantations would benefit 
from application of fertilizer or mulch. Fertilizer is costly but where land is in 
short supply its cost might be offset by higher yields. Again, few if any indigenous 
planters trouble to plant leguminous cover crops, which would both improve the soil 
and retard excessive undergrowth. 
In most places indigenous copra continues to ~e processed in small, family-
owned smoke-driers. Hot-air drying produces higher quality copra, and while hot-
air dryers cost more to build, and involve larger cooperative groups to operate 
efficiently, they have proved to be economically successful elsewhere (e.g., in Fiji). 
Transporting copra from dryer to buyer is relatively easy and inexpensive for 
most coastal producers, or for those on all-weather roads, but· because of its 
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bulkiness, moving copra from isolated inland areas (such as Atamo or inland Teop) 
can be so costly that it discourages this form of money-earning altogether when 
copra prices are low. 
Against all these liabilities now serving to reduce the economic potential of the 
Province's indigenous copra industry, one important asset of the industry must be 
noted, namely, the way in which the producers' own labor is put into it. Unlike 
most wage labor, which requires the laborers to devote many hours of many days, 
continuously, to a job, the indigenous copra producers can earn money income from 
their plantations by working in spurts and at times more or less of their own 
choosing. Harvesting and drying require devotion of several days in succession, but 
this need occur only a few times a year. Undergrowth cutting should also be done 
with some regularity, but may be spread out over time. Thus, the indigenous copra 
producer can easily fit this activity into his total work regime, including 
subsistence gardening, other kinds of cash-cropping, and even some wage-earning. 
(Some individuals manage to harvest and dry their coconuts during weekend or 
holiday leaves from distant wage-earning jobs.) 
As suggested earlier, considering the Province as a whole there is probably 
enough suitable land to accommodate .a large expansion in coconut planting. 
Unfortunately, the location and present ownership of that potential land are not 
well matched with the population that will need this source of income-but before 
describing some specific instances of this disparity, I will list some parallel 
features of Bougainvilles' other principal income-earning and land-using enterprise, 
cocoa. 
Several of the errors and oversights that reduce indigenous copra profits find 
their parallels in indigenous cocoa production. 
In the areas known to me, directly or indirectly, few growers exercise much 
care in selecting better seed l or go to the (profitable) trouble of establishing 
nurseries. 
Except in areas of heavy· cloud-cover (e.g., in parts of Buin and Siwai), cocoa 
grows best under shade. A few indigenous growers do follow the recommended 
practice, but most of these appear to plant the cocoa and intended shade tree (e.g., 
leucaena) simultaneously, which leaves the new cocoa plant unprotected during its 
initial growth period, or provides no shade at all. 
50 
Growing cocoa requires more frequent weeding than coconuts, and in addition 
the plants must be kept free of vine; observation indicates that neither of these 
measures is carried out with enough regularity. High yield also depends upon 
regular and proper pruning of suckers-but according to one observer, "fewer than 
one in a hundred" of the cocoa farmers in his area correctly understood the 
technique of pruning. 
The pests that cause most damage to the Province's cocoa are flying foxes, 
rats, and such insects as Pantorhytes-all of them liabilities but evidently not fatal 
ones. Numerous diseases affect local cocoa plants: black pod, white root rot, 
coffee borer, pod borer, thread blight, horsehair blight, etc. The first named of 
these, black pod, is damaging enough to reduce yields considerably, but few if any 
indigenous growers seem to be informed enough or interested enough to take 
prophylactic measures against it. 
Few Bougainvillian growers appear to follow very carefully the recom-
mended techniql:Jes for harvesting cocoa pods or for removing the beans, but the 
resulting damage to the beans, if any, does not appear to be serious. 
Like copra, cocoa has the advantage of allowing growers to devote much of 
their time and labor to other activities, although it is not quite so undemanding as 
copra-making in this respect. Coconuts ripen and fall fairly steadily year-round, 
and may safely be left on the ground for days or weeks before processing. Cocoa 
also ripens continuously but unlike coconuts should be harvested at least once a 
month for best results. Moreover its ripening peaks annually in a "flush," which 
requires a.dditional labor within a brief per:iod if all the crop is to be harvested and 
the plants kept relatively disease-free. 
The difference in price between wet beans and expertly-processed dry beans 
is usually large enough 'LO pay growers-especially growers who have no alternative 
money-earning jobs to compete for their labor-to process their own beans. Some 
indigenous growers do in fact ferment and dry their wet beans in small, make-shift 
village fermentaries; this however results in a dried bean which, though usually 
commercially acceptable, is often poor in quality and brings a lower price. Few 
individual growers, or family-group growers, produce enough beans to make it 
economically feasible for them to construct and operate the kind of costly 
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fermentaries capable of producing consistently high-quality dried beans. In fact, 
most growers now sell their wet beans to large fermentaries, expatriate or 
indigenous, or Jom with neighbors in supporting and managing cooperative 
fermentaries. Selling wet beans outright protects the grower from the risk of 
losses that can occur during processing and transport but, as just noted, it reduces 
his potential profits. The 'cooperative' method would seem to offer the best 
solution, with both risks and profits being widely shared-if the management were 
efficient and trustworthy (circumstances that, unhappily, have not always 
prevailed). 
Finally, as with coconuts, if one looks at the Province as a whole one could 
justifiably conclude that there is enough suitable land in it to accommodate a fairly 
large increase in cocoa growing. But, as with coconuts, most of that "extra" land 
will be increasingly required for other uses-including mainly subsistence cropping. 
Also, it is not in the form of a large undivided resource reserve that can be 
allocated to Bougainvi1lians according to individual and family needs-that is to 
say, it is divided into innumerable estates, all of them firmly owned by particular 
individuals or kin-groups, and hence not available (under present laws and customs) 
for redistribution according to need. 
Next to coconuts and cocoa the most important kind of cash-cropping 
engaged in by Bougainvillians in recent years has been garden vegetables and fruits 
grown for sale in one of three kinds of markets. The largest by far of these 
markets are the messes of BeL and its associated companies. Next in volume of 
sales are the weekly or bi-weekly markets of Arawa, Panguna, Kieta, and Buka 
Passage. And last are the rural markets that have become weekly events in several 
rural centers, e.g., Buin Town, Konga, and Wakunai. (Some food bartering has been 
engaged in for decades and perhaps centuries, as in the case of Teop (see below), 
but institutionalized commercial markets are a postwar development in the 
Province.) 
As is well known, the purchase of garden vegetables and fruits for the 
mining company messes began a decade ago and had developed into a highly 
organized enterprise, with most of the purchases being bought and transported from 
rural pick-up points by company trucks. The peak of this traffic was in 1971, 
during the mine construction phase, when recorded purchases reached $3~O,OOO per 
annum. Subsequently, with the decrease in number of employees, the purchases 
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have decreased by more than one-half, but continue to provide substantial incomes 
for many individuals. In the beginning the trade was restricted to communities 
located very close to the mine-company sites, but with improvements in roads the 
rural pick-up points have spread farther out-a trend that has been supported by a 
decrease in interest in this form of money-earning on the part of many peri-urban 
residents. In addition, a few enterprising individuals in places as far away asSiwai 
have organized large amounts of local purchases, which they then transport to BeL 
and other urban buyers. 
Bedford collected several kinds of information about the Arawa and Kieta 
markets during December and January, 1973-74: the village of origin .and sex of 
each seller, modes .. and cost of transport, percentage of produce sold and 
approximate price received. Taking Arawa as the sample, on four successive bi-
weekly market days a total of 247 sellers offered goods for sale (132 males, 115 
females). Most of the34 villages they represented were located in north and south 
Nasioi, but a few sellers came from as far away as Guava, Koromira, and Eivo. Of 
the 247 trips to market, 105 were done on foot, 140 by car or truck, and two by a 
combination of walking and riding. The walkers evidently paid nothing for their 
transport-surely, one of the only remaining free-doms left to Mankind! For those 
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riding to market the total transport costs for these four market days amounted to 
K50.50, or an average cost of KO.36 per trip. 
Turning now to the results of all that effort and expense (including of course 
the effort that went into growing the produce): of the 207 sellers who reported 
their sales, 187 sold all of their goods-a large percentage for such enterprises, it 
would seem. However, the total receipts from all these sales amounted to only 
K513.5l, which averages out to about K2.10 per seller-142 of whom, it will be 
recalled, paid an average of KO.36 per trip for transport. 
When pondering the economics of these market transactions (and Arawa is 
probably the largest and most "profitable" market in the Province) it should of 
course be added that marketing of this kind is more than an economic event -i.e., 
it has recreational and other social value for many sellers and buyers as well. But 
from a strictly economic point of view such marketing is clearly not a highway to 
wealth. Indeed, it is not unlikely that some of the sellers return home with no 
money at all to show for their efforts, having spent their meager earnings, and 
more, in slaking their thirsts, or restoring their lost calories, etc. in the market-
centers' nearby stores. 
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In an inventory of Bougainvillians' ways of money-earning the cash-cropping 
of garden vegetables and fruits for sale in urban markets and to company messes 
must be considered a widely distributed source of cash-but mainly for people 
living in communities easily accessible to those markets. Ironically, it is the 
residents of those nearby communites who also have other opportunities for earning 
money, unlike most of their compatriots in distant rural areas. 
Finally, any discussion of Bougainvillians' mone'y-earning activites must 
include a few words about recent efforts to produce beef, poultry and eggs for local 
urban markets. 
Regarding beef production, I think it may be concluded that prospects for 
large-volume production are not very hopeful. Despite a large and assured market, 
and despite major Administration efforts-promotional, advisory, and financial 
-to establish cattle growing by individual villagers or rural cooperatives, the 
results so far have been too meager to warrant optimism. Perhaps a different kind 
of organization, one involving large capital resources and expert management, 
mightevehtually succeed and bring jobs to a few Bougainvillian workers and 
dividends to Bougainvillian share-holders-but the land required for such enter-
prises would be a kind also suitable for growing food and cash crops, i.e., land 
already or soon-to-be in short overall supply. 
In comparison with cattle, recent efforts by some Bougainvillians to produce 
poultry and eggs for urban markets appear to be meeting with considerable success 
--enough, in fact, to justify additional official encouragement and assistance. 
Moreover, the land requirements for producing chickens and eggs on a commercial 
scale are small, relative to those of other agricultural activities-another mark in 
its favor. However, chicken- and egg-producing should not be viewed as a 
universal, or even major, kind of money-earning enterprise. One cannot predict 
what the future local market will be (and a foreign market appears highly unlikely), 
but it will certainly not be large enough to provide substantial incomes for more 
than a small fraction of the Province's growing population in years to come. 
But let us turn now to some specific case studies, to exemplify the above 
generali ties. 
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In 1974-75 the coastal Teop occupied three villages-one on Teop Island and 
two on the nearby mainland-and numbered 363 individuals, of whom 295 were 
resident and 68 living temporarily elsewhere (in school or at work). The land area 
owned by these coastal Teops totalled 2,080 acres, all of which corresponded to the 
CSIRO type designated as being "land suitable for cultivation with (only) minor or 
moderate limiting factors." Of this acreage 260 acres were given over to roads, 
house sites, streams and other unplantable areas, leaving a total of 1,820 acres for 
agriculture--or about five acres for each of the local residents, present or 
temporarily away from home. Since the average Teop resident consumes garden 
food-taro, sweet potatoes, bananas, yams, etc.-at the rate of about 0.2 acres 
worth a year, it might appear to the uninformed that the Teop are in no danger in 
the foreseeable future of running out of land. But consider the realities. 
First of all, Teop gardening methods involve a fallow time of about twenty 
years. This, together with a cropping time of about three years means that each 
individual will require a reserve of about 1.4 acres of arable land in addition to the 
land now being gardened, unless the fallow period is shortened. But even without 
fallow-shortening it would seem that the Teops should experience no major 
difficulties about land-providing that: 
-- the population does not increase by more than about 20 percent, ever; 
-- they continue to catch a surplus amount of fish; and 
-- they give up cash-cropping altogether. 
Unfortunately, the first of these provisos is wholly unlikely to eventuate. During 
Shoffner'S period of fieldwork, 1973-74, the natural rate of population increase was 
three percent per annum, and children under fifteen constituted over 45 percent of 
the total population-signifying that the population will double in about twenty-
three years unless there is a very marked decrease in birth rate and/or an epidemic 
increase in death rate. 
The proviso regarding fishing is based on the fact that these coastal Teop 
catch enough fish in their favored waters to enable them to eat what they want and 
trade the rest to inland Teop (a trade that has been going on for decades and 
perhaps centuries). In fact, the coastal Teop obtain about 25 percent of the 
vegetables they consume from this trade. In other words, if this source of 
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vegetables were cut off, the coastal Teop would require another one half acre per 
capita in garden land reserve in order to insure a continuing supply of vegetable 
food for themselves-with no population increase, that is. 
The third proviso is as unlikely to eventuate as the first. In 1973-74 some 
435 acres (about 21%) of the Teops' total land holdings were planted in cash crops 
and all signs pointed to continuing expansion-so long, that is, as prices for copra 
and cocoa do not plummet and remain low for long periods of time .. This prediction 
of continuing expansion of cash-cropping is based on two discernible trends. In the 
first place, the Teops, like other Bougainvillians, are acquiring larger and larger 
appetites for goods that can be obtained only with money, and unless they resume 
work as unskilled laborers on nearby expatriate plantations (which no Teop would 
probably choose unless desperate), or unless they obtain attractive employment in 
distant urban centers (which few Teops would be able to do), the only way open to 
most of them to earn money is by cash-cropping at home. And secondly, in view of 
the present circumstance that it is the more educated and widely travelled Teops 
who have taken the lead in cash-cropping, the increase in educational level that is 
now occurring will probably accelerate interest in cash-cropping in the future. 
In summary, if the Teops continue to increase in numbers at present 
rates-a conservative prediction, and if they double their cash-crop acreages 
during the period in question-an even more cautious prediction, they will reach 
the point in 1997 (i.e., the year in which their population will have doubled) when 
their lands reserved for future food gardens will amount to only 805 acres. 
As was pointed out earlier, the average Teop now annually consumes 
vegetables at a rate that takes 0.2 acres to produce (plus those vegetables obtained 
in exchange for fish). And under the present system of fallowing this requires a 
reserve of another 1.4 acres to sustain. In other words, if the predicted increases 
take place, both in population and in cash-crop acreages, the average Teop of 1997 
will continue to have a 0.2 acre garden from which to obtain his current vegetable 
food needs (a total of 145.2 acres for all Teops), but 1.1 acres in reserve for future 
garden needs (a total of 805 for all Teops). - And the margin between land under 
cultivation and land in reserve would continue to decrease wih every passing year. 
Of course, the final day of reckoning could be postponed somewhat by 
shortening the fallow time-but that could only be done by use of fertilizer, which 
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would be very costly, or by introduction of new, short-fallow crops. (It is of course 
conceivable that the conventional fallow times, in Teop and elsewhere, are in fact 
longer than necessary, and that they could be shortened without significant 
reduction in production-but such possiblilites should be experimentally demon-
strated before they are officially proposed.) 
Another way by which the reckoning might conceivably be postponed would 
be by using the money earned from cash-cropping to purchase food equivalent to 
that lost through diminished gardens. This conception is however erroneous in at 
least one important respect. As will be shown below, the profits earned from cash-
cropping, as presently practiced throughout the province, are not sufficient to 
purchase, at present prices, the amount of food that is now grown on equivalent 
acreages of land. And unless prices for cash crops rise steadily and at the same 
rate as prices for store-bought food this discrepancy will become even wider over 
time. 
In conclusion, even highly favored coastal Teop will soon reach the day when 
there is not enough land available locally to feed its expanding population. More 
fortunate than most inlanders, they will still have fish for the catching, but unless 
large numbers of the Teop work elsewhere for wages, and send generous 
remittances home, they will not be able to grow or purchase the staples that make 
up most of their diet-nor all the other goods and services that they are becoming 
increasingly dependent upon. 
Nagovisi 
Compared with coastal Teop the Nagovisi's entry into a money-based 
economy has been more recent and rapid. In fact, until the vehicular "Buin" road 
was cut through to join with BCL's Jaba pump-station road terminus, Nagovisi's 
main links with the outside world were by foot, by air, or by long-distance roads 
and sea. However, by way of the new road links goods and people now move 
between Nagovisi and Panguna-Arawa-Kieta in ever-increasing volume, thereby 
expanding and intensifying Nagovisi's wants for non-indigenous goods. The 
question, again is: How have the Nagovisi's fared in satisfying their newly acquired 
wants? And what are their prospects for doing so in the future? 
The best information available about Nagovisi society and economy concerns 
specifically only one small part of it, the Porn alate village area of south-central 
Nagovisi. However, the authors of this study imply that their findings are typical 
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of Nagovisi as a whole. Several writings have come out of this study (e.g., J. Nash, 
1972, 1974; D. Mitchell, 1971, 1976; n.d.; D. Mitchell, J. Nash., and E. Ogan); the one 
I make most use of here is D. Mitchell's Land and Agriculture in Nagovisi, one of 
the most comprehensive and best-documented reports ever published on the 
economics of Melanesian agriculture. 
The main problem faced in Mitchell's monograph is described by the author 
as follows: "How have the Nagovisi fitted the cultivation of permanent tree crops, 
the products of which are exchanged for money, into a system based on the shifting 
cultivation of root crops; and can it be said that this change represents any kind of 
an advance in either the social, economic, or ecological sense?" As Mitchell points 
out, many expatriate advisors and indigenous leaders hold that " .•• increasing 
participation by all sections of (Papua New Guinea) society in the world monetary 
economy is a sine qua non of 'development'." And, he goes on to state, even at the 
village level " •.. there are few who doubt that the way to 'progress' is to increase 
money incomes and to consume more Western-manufactured goods and food." 
Continuing, he adds, "No one would doubt that some cash income is essential to 
modern rural life on Bougainville (and elsewhere) or that rural life has improved in 
some measurable ways in consequence of cash-cropping. But there have been some 
heavy costs ..• ", which he proceeds to describe. 
As elsewhere on Bougainville, the Nagovisi made the change-over from taro 
to sweet potato gardening quite successfully. At prewar rates of popUlation 
increase and without a large-scale shift to cash-cropping they would likely have 
been able to feed themselves adequately and healthfully for generations to come. 
Disparities in landownership do exist, some clans being land-rich per capita and 
others land-poor; but in the past the latter usually experienced little or no 
difficulty in obtaining pemission to locate their food gardens on the lands of the 
former. However, with recent increases in population this kind of adjustment has 
become more and more impracticable, and has been greatly complicated by the 
massive change-over to commercial cocoa growing. 
As cocoa growers the Nagovisi are probably no better or worse than other 
Bougainvillians. Regarding maintenance, Mitchell states, " .•. about the only care 
taken of cocoa is cutting the grass and removing the vines from the trees. 
Probably fewer than one in a hundred Nagovisi cocoa farmers understands the 
technique of pruning and o.ther regular maintenance procedures which are necessary 
if the cocoa is to bear at a high level. Certainly none of the cocoa stands with 
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which I am familiar have been well maintained and there is no doubt that yields 
have suffered as a result. Ignorance has been the most important factor in lack of 
maintenance. Most growers are aware that 'the branches should be cut' but no 
Pomalate or Biroi grower had been carefully instructed in the actual techniques of 
using secateur, saw and pruning knife. No instruction had been given regarding 
prophylactic measures against thread blight and black pod diseases, although, again, 
these were recognized by the growers as difficulties which should ideally be dealt 
with." 
Mitchell continues, "Growers who were considered successful were in fact 
successful not because they grew cocoa efficiently (had stands which produced at 
high rates for a given area), but because they had large, extensive stands which, 
even though they produced at a low rate, nevertheless produced large quantities of 
beans. Growers seem to have concluded that extensive stands were necessary for 
large production and in many cases growers planted more cocoa then they could 
possibly care for .•. " 
In summary, Mitchell states, "Most of the problems which have led to poor 
maintenance might be overcome if it were considered desirable or necessary to do 
so. It seems clear that with better maintenance, the yields of Nagovisi cocoa could 
be increased, perhaps by a factor of two or three times." 
Mitchell also observed that many Nagovisis do not follow recommended 
procedures for harvesting beans, but this does not seem to have resulted in 
widespread damage to them. 
In terms of soil and climate it is clear that the Nagovisi area is well suited 
to cocoa growing, despite the presence of the few pests and diseases found there. 
On the other hand, the topography is too uneven and the soil patterns too 
diversified to permit the development of large contiguous plantings, such as occur 
on coastal (and mainly expatriate) plantations, and such as would favor large-scale 
and more mechanical methods of production. Moreover, the location of much of 
Nagovisi's cocoa gardens, separated as they are by long and often road1ess distances 
from processing or marketing centers, must be considered a major liablilty. 
Nearly all the cocoa production known to Mitchell was organized on a sing1e-
household basis, most efforts at larger-scale production having proved unsuccessful. 
Until 1968 most wet beans were dried in small make-shift village 
fermentaries; this often resulted in dried beans of barely acceptable quality. 
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Subsequently most beans grown in the area were sold, wet or dry, to the BANA 
Society, which had better facilities. And in recent years some of the beans have 
been sold directly to brokers in Kieta or Buin, at slightly higher prices than could 
be obtained from BANA. 
Transport of cocoa beans in any sizeable quantities from fermentary to port-
side buyers (and in some cases, from garden to fermentary) requires dependable 
vehicles and navigable roads-both of which cost large sums of money to acquire 
and maintain, and neither of which appears to be included in calculations 
concerning I1profits" from cocoa production. On the one hand, few if any growers 
seem to amortize, consciously, the original costs of their vehicles against sales 
receipts of beans, nor do they plan for or amortize maintenance costs of those 
vehicles--a very large cost i tern because of the local climate and roads. 
Another evaluation criterion that must be applied to Nagovisi cocoa 
production concerns the labor: are the man hours devoted to it "adequately" 
compensated in terms of the individual "profits" derived from it? In the Nagovisi 
setting the answer to that question is simplified-but by no means entirely 
answered-by the circumstances that, other than vegetable-growing for the 
Panguna and Arawa markets, there is no other local money-earning work to which 
labor can be applied. 
Still another measuring-stick to apply to Nagovisi cocoa growing concerns 
the scale and efficiency of its work structure-that is to say, is it managed and 
organized as efficiently and economically as possible? 
According to Mitchell, the production stage of the industry is carried out by 
household groups, and works quite well. Some efforts have been made in the past 
to organize larger-scale producer groups but these have not endured. The small 
size of household groups rules out the labor-division efficiencies made possible in 
larger groups, but small-group operation is well-suited to the fragmented nature of 
cocoa"-growing sites. (In this connection, it is interesting to note that Nagovisi's 
matrilineal clan organization and its concomitant pattern of land tenure and 
marital residence location-i.e., the husbands go to live in their wives' 
villageS_does not appear to have served as an institutional deterrent to cash-
cropping, as has been the case in some other matrilineal areas, notably in Central 
Africa. (ct. J. Nash, 1974).) 
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In another sense however cash-cropping has brought about a break with 
traditional Nagovisi agricultural practice. Whereas people were formerly generous 
in sharing land and labor with one another in the production of crops for home 
consumption, they now demand rent or wages when lending their land or labor to 
people (other than household mates) for the production of cocoa. 
In summary, although the productivity of cocoa-growing could be increased 
through improvements in planting, maintenance and processing methods,· it now 
provides many Nagovisis with a domestic and culturally congenial way of obtaining 
money incomes. But can this situation continue for long? 
For some individuals (i.e., those fortunate enough to belong to land-rich 
clans) this happy situation could continue for a generation or so-unless the market 
price for cocoa falls far and remains very low. But for many others their 
agricultural'1ands are already in short supply. Of course, it is conceivable that such 
disparities in land ownership might be corrected by voluntary or forced redistribu-
tion, but for various social and political reasons neither of these measures is likely 
to eventuate. And it is at least conceivable that the land-poor might acquire what 
they need from the land-rich by purchase-, provided the former had the necessary 
money (which is unlikely to be the case) and provided that the latter would be 
willing to sell (which is rarely the case). In any case, taking Nagovisi "as a whole," 
even redistribution, by government fiat or voluntary exchange, will only serve to 
postpone for a few years the crisis being brought on by Nagovisi's increasing 
population and by their continuin& inclination to convert garden land into cocoa. 
Concerning the , latter, Mitchell's studies indicate that one hectare of 
agricultural land can provide enough food for the average ,size household for about 
five years, before fallowing. On the other hand the same hectare converted to 
cocoa (and hence more or .less 'permanently' removed from food production) will 
bring in an. annual money income (if prices remain high) of only $100, which " •• 
. cannot possibly purchase enough imported foodstuffs to maintain each household, 
even without considering such (other) expenses as taxes, school fees, traditional 
obligations and soon." 
Of course, if each household had at its disposal enough land for gardening 
and cash-cropping, all would be well. 'But, as Mitchell points out, some households 
are already approaching the limits of their land resources. And if Nagovisi's 
population growth continues much longer at its present rate, cash-cropping will 
have to be significantly improved in productivity and greatly reduced in planting 
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area in favor of food-growing if the future population is to obtain enough food 
staples, let alone the other goods and services that have become essential parts of 
their Ii ves. 
For better appreciation of the impending crisis in Nagovisi economy the 
reader is urged to read Mitchell's impressively documented monograph. In addition 
to the persuasive case he makes for the impending crisis in material welfare, he 
draws attention in his monograph to a kind of social crisis which is developing in 
Nagovisi, namely, a kind of social inequality based on property-specifically on 
disparities in land ownership. As Mitchell says, Nagovisi have always had ~omiako 
and bakilo (big-men and destitute) but this distinction has never rested on much 
more than hard work. Anyone could become a momiako through hard work and 
most bakilo were lazy and unskillful. Bl,Jt this is not the same thing as becoming a 
momiako because of a few hundred hectares of bush, or becoming bakilo because 
cash cropping froze the Jand holdings in a clan at a time when some had none. 
In one instance, at least, some have-not clans were beginning to unity in a 
cargo-like organization which was anti-modernist in ideology and socially factional-
izing in effect (J. Nash, 1974); it remains to be seen whether this reaction to the 
new kind of "poverty" will occur elsewhere. 
Siwai 
Our most recent data on Siwai were collected by John Connell who engaged 
in field study there between October 1974 and April 1976. At present writing 
(November 1977) Connell has not yet completed what promises to be a very 
comprehensive and detailed mongraph on most aspects of contemporary Siwai 
economy, but the data he has recorded so far on population, land use, gardening, 
and cash-cropping will enable us to compare SiWai with our other area samples in 
terms of our principal focus, namely, the long-term prospects faced by each area's 
residents in satisfying their material wants by utilization of local resources. 
For the present , and in the immediate future, the Siwai as a whole appear to be 
fortunately placed. In gardening the transition from taro to sweet potato has been 
successfully accomplished. Small amounts of taro continue to thrive in some 
places, for use mainly on ceremonial occasions, but sweet potatoes are now the 
accepted staple and are grown in ample quantities-enough both for domestic 
consumption and for "export" to urban centers. The Siwai also plant other food 
crops in their gardens-including "Chinese taro (Xanthosoma), yams, cassava, 
bananas, corn, pumpkins, sugar cane, and aibika (Hibuscus manihot)-and while (like 
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most other Bougainvillians) they could and should place more emphasis on plant 
variety (especially the less starchy ones) in their gardens-and thence in their 
diets-there appears to be enough land available, and in current use, to ensure 
enough calories for all present Siwai. (Ironically, the Siwai appear to have reduced 
the variety of the food-pI ants-not in order to reduce gardening labor but because 
of a preference for store-bought foods.) 
According to Connell's measurements and calculations, a producing garden 
of about 0.15 acres is sufficient to feed one person (on the average) quite 
adequately-adequate, that is, in terms of calories. 
Inasmuch as the Siwai continue to raise pigs and to feed them mainly with 
garden produce, the per capita figure for garden-size requirement needs amending, 
upwards, but how much upwards is difficult if not impossible to estimate. 
Compared with Buka and north and east Bougainville, coconuts grow poorly 
in Siwai (possibly because of the heavier cloud cover); nevertheless the Siwais 
produce enough nuts for domestic use, and in addition, many of them own enough 
palms to produce copra for sale-when the price is high enough to induce them to 
do so. During the peak-price year of 1974, for example, many individual Siwais 
earned up to $500 or so from copra, but with the fall in prices production dwindled 
to almost zero, and higher priced cocoa became the object of most Siwai's cashcrop 
efforts. 
At the time of my writing, Connell's discussion on Siwai cocoa production 
has not yet been completed, but he makes it clear in other chapters of his report 
that cocoa has become far and away the area's most important cash crop-in terms 
of acreages, labor and money income; and while it is not yet reported how much 
land is being devoted to cocoa growing, and hence removed from foodplant growing, 
Connell does state that-"overall there is no contemporary land shortage on Siwai. 
" 
The evidence for Connell's statement is based on rough calculations of per 
capita land needs (which are somewhat uncertain), on estimates of land carrying-
capacity (which are speculative, to say the least), and on personal observation (of 
the existence of extensive unplanted areas). However, it should be noted that 
Connell qualifies his statement, i.e., his use of the term "overall" by adding that, " . 
. . the problems (of land availability) are those of land distribution over space and 
between groups." (This is yet another expression of the previously noted 
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predicament, that while there may be enough land now available for food-
production and cashcropping, it is not always available to the people who need it.) 
As he says, " ••• some matrilineages are already short of land." 
Moreover, Connell's comforting estimate of overall land sufficiency must be 
recognized as referring to "now." As described earlier, Siwai's 1975 population of 
9,000 appears to be increasing at a rate whereby it could double its numbers by 
about 1987-88. And even with some slackening of that galloping rate, the time is 
sure to come, within a century or less, when Siwai gardens will have to be extended 
into the inhospitable marsh lands towards the coast and the rugged mountain land~ 
in the north, unless these enterprising people curb their wants for imported goods 
and services, or unless they discover and utilize other means for earning 
money-or, of course, unless they emigrate in large numbers. 
Eivo 
According to Michael Hamnett, who carried out field work in A tamo 
between August 1974 and May 1976, the Eivo and Simeku speakers in that area were 
much like the Teop, the Nagovisi, and the Siwai in terms of the growing and 
processing of their cash crops, but even more handicapped than the Nagovisi with 
respect to marketing, i.e., villagers living on the eastern side of the Crown Prince 
Range had to carry their produce over a three-hour walk to the nearest vehicular 
road terminal, at Manetai, while those Eivo living on the western slopes of the 
range had an even longer path to negotiate and over mountainous terrain. (The 
Simeku village of Korpei was better off than others in this regard, having had close 
access to a vehicular road for a number of years. Consequently, perhaps, Korpei 
villagers were the first of their ethnic mates to plant cocoa and now probably have 
the largest number of trees per capita-a clear indication of the relation between 
cash-cropping and market access.) 
Despite their transport difficulties all of the villages in the area observed by 
Hamnett had planted cash crops, except for the residents of Kopani, who were 
involved in a kago movement that rejected cash crops-particularly cocoa-as 
"samting bilong 01 waitmen." Thus, it would appear that most residents in the 
area, like Bougainvillians elsewhere, entertained hopes and expectations of earning 
some money in this way-which, incidentally, was the only way for money-earning 
open to them at or near home.-By mid-1976 however such hopes were yet to be 
realized by the average grower. In Atamo, for example, the 57 cocoa growers 
without fermentaries of their own earned an average of only K25.67 during 1975. 
The four A tamos who owned and operated fermentaries did much better. having 
64 
earned a total of K6309.70 through their productive and processing activities-but 
their larger earnings were accomplished, clearly at the expense of their 57 grower-
only village mates. This disparity was of course perceived and commented upon by 
some of the growers, some of whom had built, or were in the process of building 
fermentaries of their own. However, Hamnett recorded instances wherein such 
ventures had failed, due mainly to lack of technical knowledge. Moreover, had 
more than the four successful ones actually succeeded, this would have decreased 
somewhat the disparity between growers and grower-processers, but it would not 
have increased the total or per-capita A tamo income from cocoa in the end. 
In nearby Kanavitu the total income from cocoa was about the same as that 
of· A tamo in 1975-the two villages had 10,888 and 11,689 cocoa trees, 
respectively-but the distribution of that income was quite different. In Kanavitu 
the 19 growers constituted a society and processed all their cocoa through the 
society's fermentary. In 1975 the society's total income from sale of processed 
beans was K6093.38. Of this, K1240.41 was distributed among the growers-i.e., an 
average of K65.25 per grower, or in terms of the village's total population, only 
K4.36 per capita. The rest of the proceeds was either banked (K845.00) or used to 
purchase goods for sale by the society's store. 
As for the other villages in the Eivo census division, they had at the time 
some 32,220 cocoa trees in production, and those yielded even smaller incomes, per 
grower, and per capita, than those of A tamo and Kanavitu. Nevertheless, the 
people of the census division continued to increase their plantings, and to build new 
fermentaries, in the, now somewhat tarnished, hope that wealth would eventually 
come from this source. 
The people of Eivo census division displayed even more persistent hopes for 
the future of copra-perhaps because of their longer experience with it and the less 
efforts it demanded--even though little of it was made or sold at the time. (For 
example, in 1975 only 14 bags, which brought a net income of only K84.40, and 
which, like cocoa, had to be carried by foot the several miles to the nearest 
vehicular road.) 
Against all these difficulties experienced by residents of Eivo in establishing 
cash-cropping, and against the small money-incomes obtained by them so far, must 
be balanced the circumstance that the Eivo still possess ample land for both food 
and cash-cropping; i.e., according to the 1972 census the division contained only 6.7 
persons per square mile. However, this favorable situation will not continue for 
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more than two or three generations, if the present rate of natural increase 
continues, and if the present trend to cash-cropping persists. And even before that 
pressure on land becomes critical, many people of this division will have to shift 
their residences in order to live nearer the diminishing agricultural lands, even to 
the extent of returning to the remote and roadless western slopes of the Crown 
Prince Range. Thus there will develop an ironical situation in which many Eivos, in 
their efforts to enjoy more fully the material benefits obtainable only by money, 
will be forced to live even farther away from the urban centers from which those 
material benefits derive. Before such a westward move becomes necessary, many 
Eivos will shift their groves and gardens eastward, nearer to the recently 
completed coastal road-a move, in fact, that was already in progress in 1975. But 
eventually that area will also fill up, and the westward trek will have to begin. 
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11. Rural Businesses 
Despite their knowledge about numerous store failures many Bougainvillians 
persist in viewing retailing as the shortest road to financial success. To preside 
over shelves holding readily selling staples and brightly labeUed manufactures is 
seen by many to be far more attractive than planting, harvesting, and processing 
cash crops, or engaging in physicaUy demanding wage work. Even the labor of 
acquiring goods for sale is viewed by many as more adventure than drudgery, and a 
kind of prestige-enhancing mystique attaches to many retailing enterprises, 
however modest these may actually be. 
Some of the roots of this widespread attitude,may be traced to the prewar 
era, when viturally all retailing was in the hands of foreigners, Europeans or 
Chinese, and thus represented a mysterious and wholly unattainable level of 
material wealth. The war then served to change this situation in two important 
ways. First, the war itself put a stop to all store-bought commodities for the 
duration, thereby creating a universal and unsatisfiable demand. Later on, the 
distribution of war reparations provided many persons with the cash to satisfy that 
demand (and for a few, to enter the retailing business itself). As a result trade 
stores sprang up everywhere--e.g., in remote Nagovisi, where prewar there was not 
one indigenous store, by 1955 there were twenty-six. Moreover, this proliferation 
was not a momentary fad--e.g., in the Buin and Kieta census divisions surveyed by 
Moulik in his 1973 study there were 322 such stores, each having an average of only 
108 steady customers. 
To characterize such enterprises I can do no better than quote from D. 
Mitchell's study: 
... The establishment of a village 'store' is a predictable Nagovisi 
pattern, which appears to be similar in many, if not most, respects to 
those in other parts of Bougainville. Village stores generally operate 
as small co-operatives, although the investors never conceive of them 
as such. Village households contribute share capital, usually on the 
order of $10 per household, which is used to purchase an initial 
shipment of trade store goods from a merchant in one of the urban 
centers, or from a local whole-sale co-operative (one began to 
function in 1969, in Nagovisi, but ceased operations in 1974). 
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These goods are put in the store, marked up, then primarily purchased 
by the store's 'owners' who do not receive any discount. As stocks 
dwindle, the store's cash generally increases and a new shipment of 
goods is then brought in. Villagers may 'charge' goods, although 
nearly every store has a sign prohibiting dinau (debts). Profits, when 
there are any, are never distributed among the investors. Eventually, 
most stores collapse, usually through real or alleged fraud (more 
often, in fact, just mismanagement and poor accounting). Upon 
collapse, most investors get back their original investment and not 
much else. There are exceptions, of course; some stores are well run, 
appear to turn a profit (although even in the best-run stores, they are 
not distributed to the investors) and are usually well-stocked. More 
commonly, a store will have a lifetime of one or two years before 
collapse; after a short period, a new one will be organized, usually by 
a different kin group within the village and will live out its own 
lifespan. (D. Mitchell 1976: 123) 
Mitchell then goes on to state that: " a store run along standard individual 
entrepreneurial capitalistic lines would not succeed in the (Nagovisi) village 
context. The owner would be seen as personally profiting from the villagers while 
they receive nothing." 
The account by Eugene Ogan about trade stores in the Aropa Valley reveals 
a more complicated situation. In 1962-6lJ. (the year of his first study there) many of 
the trade stores in the Valley were associated with indigenous copra production and 
some of them took on the aura of cargo-ism. In Ogan's words: 
The pattern for these new "bisnis" ventures was remarkably uniform: 
a man with some knowledge of European ways-who was at least 
fluent in Pidgin, at most the possessor of a mission secondary 
education- and more than average coconut holdings, solicited cash 
contributions from villagers in his own area and beyond. With this 
capital he attempted to act as agent for copra sales and manager of 
one or more tradestores. In each case the goal of 'living like 
Europeans' proved unattainable with the limited material, educational 
and organizational resources available, at which time activities were 
noticed by Eu:ropeans which they identified as 'cargo cult'. (Ogan 
1972: 161-162) 
In fact, writes Ogan, " 'bisnis' and 'kago' (i.e., material and spiritual riches 
obtained by supernatural means) were never differentiated in Nasioi minds, and ... 
the emphasis on supernatural elements only increased as the, in European eyes, 
business-like aspects of the various operations failed." 
Ogan's monograph contains case studies of the beginnings and ends of several 
of the Aropa 'bisnis'-some of which involved substantial amounts of kago thinking, 
and none of which was conducted according to usual commercial methods of 
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bookkeeping, pricing, inventory control, credit constraints, etc. For example, in 
the case of one store: 
Jude (the store keeper) maintained that the regular mark-up over the 
price paid to Wo Fat for goods was 5¢ per 50¢ Bakatung's manager 
quoted 5¢ per $1). However, on the one occasion when Sebastian 
delivered the order in person, he set prices on a more haphazard 
basis, with mark-ups averaging 5¢ to 10¢ on every item over 40¢, but 
never exceeding 50¢ on even the most expensive items. (Perhaps for 
my benefit, he carried out this procedure with maximum use of Pidgin 
and English billingsgate-for example, "Makim tu bloody 
shilling"-much in the manner Wo Fat's sons employed when dealing 
with Nasioi). Special order items, on the other hand, such as beer for 
a party or a Petromax lamp for Jude, apparently received no mark-up 
at all. (Ogan 1972: 168) 
An examination of Jude's books revealed to Ogan " .. a kind of 'bookkeeping' 
in which no accounts balance." For example, when Jude returned to the relatives 
of a recently deceased share-holder the latter's share in the store enterprise. he 
calculated the figure to be eighteen dollars. According to Jude's calculations the 
deceased " ... had made an initial contribution to the store of $10, and had 
purchased some $10 to $15 worth of goods before his death: therefore (sic) his 
'profit' came to $18." 
Continuing about the hopeless, but ever-hopeful, Jude (who eventually was 
typical of Aro'pa store-managers in those days), Ogan wrote: 
Even more disastrous for the store, however, was the problem of 
"dinau" or credit. Every tradestore in the 'chain' which I visited 
posted a sign forbidding extension of credit: "Dinau itarnbu" or "Ino 
gat dinau." Yet every store extended credit, with the rationale that 
shareholding made this the individual's right. Jude argued that no 
villager would leave the area without settling his obligations. This 
was perhaps true, but the argument shows no awareness of the 
reduced liquidity resulting from sales on credit. 
For example, each month the Rumba store purchased about $230 
worth of goods from Wo Fat. Assuming a mark-up of 10 percent, the 
store's margin would total $23 per month, from which Jude's $12 
salary and a transport fee of about $2 had to be paid. At best the 
store might have a net sum of $10 above the obligation to Wo Fat. In 
fact, "dinau" at Rumba store never went below $50 during 1963-64; 
the largest debtors, Edmund and Casimir, never reduced their 
combined debt to less than $40, and many men had balances of $2 to 
$4, which they periodically cleared. Consequently each month cash 
available to purchase stock would be at least $40 less than the value 
of stock desired. Unlike Jude, Wo Fat would not extend credit 
indefini tely, so that Sebastian had to exert pressure on Rumba 
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villagers or make up the deficit himself. In any event, "dinau" alone 
would have eventually caused the collapse of the store. 
In addition, traditional values of generosity and sympathy impinged 
upon Jude. When Antsi died, her maternal grandfather wished to 
provide an impressive offering of food to funeral visitors. He went to 
Jude and asked for rice, tinned fish, tea, biscuits and sugar, saying 
that he would give up his share capital in the store as payment. (Of 
course, in Western bookkeeping his share capital had already been 
consumed by haphazard management.) Jude gave him the goods 
outright, to an estimated value of $20, on the basis that he was "sori" 
for the grandfather's bereavement. (Ogan 1972: 169) 
Hamnett reports that the situation was similar in Atamo. Several 
indi viduals had operated stores there since the 1950s but few of them had kept 
track of profits and losses and few had survived. During Hamnett's stay there in 
1975-76 a store was operated by a young man with some business training-and 
evidently a better-than-average "business sense." However, when his goods were 
priced higher than 0 those of stores in the towns-reflecting his higher transport 
costs, etc.-his neighbors complained, one saying, "When we got our own stores 
after independence we were sure the prices would drop-but they haven't; prices 
here in the village are now higher than ever." In another case reported by 
Hamnett, a store owner (now no longer in business) had deliberately priced his 
goods lower than cost, explaining., "I don't need to make a profit; I have cash crops." 
Without comparable data from all other parts of the Province one cannot 
assert that village retailing is everywhere like the stores described by Mitchell, 
Ogan and Hamnett; in fact, a few that I have seen appear to be quite successful. 
However, the failures and the barely-surviving ones seem to outnumber the 
successful ones by a wide margin-in terms of conventional "profits," that is. In 
some other respects, even the failures may serve useful purposes while they last. 
As Mitchell writes: 
These stores serve a very useful service function-making imported 
goods available to the villagers-and in that respect alone they are 
seen as worthwhile. The idea of profits is always strongly stressed, 
but the fact that none ever appears is not really seen as a drawback. 
When stores do run well, the profits are invested in other things. One 
store has expanded into transportation and other activities, very 
successf ull y. 
As economic phenomena, trade stores are almost exactly analogous to 
other forms of Nagovisi economic cooperation: capital is taken in, 
some kind of work is done, investors are 'happy' and 'proud' to think of 
what they have formed. No direct monetary benefits accrue to the 
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investors, but all benefit from the services provided. (D. Mitchell 
1976: 123) 
The most usual causes of village trade-store failure in the past have been, in 
Mitchell's words, " ••• internal dissensiori(i.e., among share-holders) or mismanage-
ment, or (rarely) fraud." In the future hbwever such stores will have to contend 
more and more with large 'urban stores, including some indigenously owned and 
operated ones, which can offer a dazzling Variety of goods at less than village-store 
prices, and which are becoming evermore accessible by means of the Province'S 
expanding road network and increasing number of vehicles. 
. . . 
In any case, whatever other' useful purposes the Province'S village stores may 
serve, they are not lii<ely in present form to produce sizeable monetary profits for 
many of their owners. With drastic reduction' in numbers, and with changes in 
organization and management,' ;6me of them might provide handsome profits to a 
few owners, or-what is more Hkely-help 'to reduce prices for larger numbers of 
share-holder customers, but· that is about' all they can be reasonably expected to 
accomplish in monetary terms. 
Although trade stores are the most visible type of rural business enterprise, 
they are not the only one, and in some places, they are not the most income-
generating ones. In the Ata~o area, for ex'ample, cocoa processing has probably 
been more profitable than retailing. Hamnett writes as follows about these 
enterprises: 
Some proc~ssing businesses are set up like co-ops but members have 
not remained satisfied with their return.' One or two men have run 
such operations and "profits" have been either banked or put into 
trade stores and the "members" have seen no return. 
Prior to the establishment. of "co-ops" a few individuals (most of 
whom received some training from DASF) set up cocoa dryers and 
began buying wet beans at a fairly Ibwprice-KO.05 per pound. They 
fermented and dried the beans and then paid for transport to Kieta. 
These men made "profits" (i.e., incOme over and above costs) 
substantially higher than growers. 
By 1975, enough growers were fed~up Wit'h the lack of income from 
the co-ops a.nd selling wet beans to private entrepreneurs, that many 
were building or planning to build their own dryers. When I went to 
A tamo, there were two cocoa fermentaries. By the time I left there 
were four operating and two others under construction. This 
proliferation of cocoa businesses was also occurring in other Eivo and 
Simeku areas. ..' -
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When the completion of the Kieta-Wakunai Road became a reality, 
there were several Eivo and Simeku speakers organizing groups to 
buy trucks. 
For Eivo, I would say that most would-be entrepreneurs see 
cocoa-then transport businesses financed by cocoa-as the way to 
make money. A number of people have been burnt on trade stores 
and although a few people still dabble in stores, I think more see 
cocoa fermentaries and then, if they get enough income, trucks, as 
the enterprises to which they aspire. 
The Siwai have been much more active than the Eivo-Simeku in operating 
rural businesses. According to Connell's Report, now aWCl:iting publication, most 
attempts to organize and operate stores and other kinds of commerical enterprises 
in Siwai have with a few exceptions fared no better than those just described. Like 
the latter some of the "stores" are little more than family or lineage commisaries, 
which provide their share-holder members with goods otherwise obtainable only in 
distant centers like Buin Town or Kieta. And, as elsewhere, others of them 
constitute parts of enterprises involving also the production or processing or 
transporting or marketing of cash crops. As such, few of these stores return any 
profit to their owners, other than savings in the time and (rarely) money that would 
be used in buying from distant shops. 
Organizationally, most of these rural businesses, whether separate retail 
outlets or multi-faceted complexes, are "owned," theoretically, by numbers of 
shareholders (e.g., lineage mates, village neighbors), but are managed, almost 
exclusively, by one or two individuals. Like their numerous counterparts elsewhere 
in the Province, few of them survive very long, and fewer still earn any monetary 
profits for their shareholders. 
In addition to the multi-owned enterprises just mentioned, Siwai contains 
several individually-owned businesses, ranging from single-faceted ones (e.g., 
stores, bakeries, fermentaries, transport services) to complexes containing two or 
more facets. As with the multi-owned ones, most of these do not manage to 
survi ve very long, or continue to limp along at a very modest pace. However, in 
striking contrast to all the above businesses, multi- or individually-owned, there are 
a few individually-owned Siwai businesses that have succeeded remarkably 
well-both in providing useful services to fellow Siwais and in earning substantial 
money incomes for their owner-managers. Case studies of these successful 
enterprises are contained in Connell's report; they merit close study as models for 
potential development elsewhere. 
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Finally, Connell notes in his report that, historically, the Si wai appear to be 
shifting from multi- to individually-owned (and managed) business enterprises. This 
trend, together with the fact that the more financially successful businesses are 
individually owned, suggests that the two circumstances may be causally 
linked-but this does not mean that multi-ownership as such is necessarily a 
disadvantage, in Siwai or elsewhere. Nor does it follow that the monetary success 
of a few outstanding entrepreneurs is a more desirable social goal than that 
exemplified by the individually smaller but more widely distributed profits that 
might be earned through multi-ownership business enterprises. 
In connection with the latter, Bougainville has been the scene of numerous 
"cooperatives" during the past three decades. Some of them have been initiated 
and assisted by Administration officials, others through purely local initiative and 
resources. Some of them have been utter failures from their very beginnings, 
others have failed or slowed down after years of early success, and a few continue 
to operate as highly successful and widely useful enterprises. By their very nature 
they are (or should be) even-handed facilitators for the productive activities of 
their whole memberships, and do not (or should not) serve to promote the financial 
success of a few privileged leaders. 
The reports written by some members of our research program contain 
descriptions of the histories and operations of some of these co-operatives, but 
they are not representative enough, geographically, to permit generalizations to be 
made about the Province's co-operatives as a whole. 
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12. Urban Indigenous Businesses 
I write this section of the Report without knowing the present (November 
1977) status of indigenous businesses in the Province's main urban area. From the 
histories of those that commenced before 1975, however, it is possible to draw 
some conclusions that may also be applicable to more recent, and to near-future, 
enterprises of this kind. 
The first of these conclusions is that the profits (and losses) derived from 
those enterprises were restricted to a very small number of individuals. Up to 1975 
a typical enterprise-retail, transport, restaurant, etc.-was initiated by two or 
three venturesome and relatively sophisticated individuals acting on their own or as 
representatives of several clansmen and friends. Moreover, the numbers engaged in 
those earlier enterprises were further limited through the circumstance that 
several of the principals were investors and "directors" in two or more operating 
businesses--either separate companies or those linked into "holding companies." 
A second finding regarding the pre-1975 urban businesses is that most of 
their founders occupied high-status positions, either in BCL, or politics, or both. 
Also, many if not most of the founders were actively encouraged to start their 
business-with advice, finance, and technical assistance-from BCL and the 
Administration. In other words, any profits that the businesses may have earned 
went mainly to individuals (and their close associates) already earning relatively 
large incomes, or already holding economically favored positions. (Conversely, the 
losses incurred in the failures of some of those businesses had to be borne by the 
same few principals- who however in most cases were protected from destitution 
by income from their other jobs.) 
A third finding is that the private financing for the pre-l975 indigenous 
businesses (the rest having come from "public" sources, such as development-bank 
loans or PDF) derived mainly from BCL compensation payments and rents-which, 
incidentally, were at the time almost the sole source of large amounts of readily 
available and unencumbered indigenes' savings (still another reason why these 
enterprises were limited to the residents of areas within or near the mine complex). 
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Since 1975 some developments in "private" indigenous businesses indicate a 
widening of the potential benefits-and losses!-from this type of money income. 
One of the most successful of these businesses is described by Connell in his Taim 
Bilong Mani, and concerns a Siwai, Luke Pauru, who by 1970 owned the most 
sophisticated trade store in Siwai, and was also involved in transport and cocoa 
purchasing enterprises • 
. In 1972 with the assistance of a Development Bank loan Pauru took up 
a lease on one of the earliest shops to be constructed in the Arawa 
town centre. He operated this as a general trade store, the first to 
be owned by a Bougainvillean in Arawa, and hence heavily patronised 
by urban Bougainvilleans. Stock came directly from Australia, 
Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong, apart from Papua New Guinea. In 
the first full year of operation, to July 1975, the store earned a net 
profit of $24,000 (and Development Bank records suggest that the 
profit over the calendar year 1975 was $53,000). The success of this 
first store, which employed 5-6 Siwais, enabled him to set up a second 
store in 1975, selling clothing, and by 1976 he was intending to set up 
new branches in Rabaul and possibly Port Moresby. 
At present there are few entrepreneurs with the business expertise of 
Luke Pauru and no other locally owned stores that have achieved this 
level of success. Although his rural stores started in the same way 
that others had done in Siwai, involving numerous contributions from 
friends and kin, the urban stores were essentially individual 
enterprises in which only one other Siwai made a financial 
contr ibution. 
Another move in the direction of private business is exemplified by some of 
the older and more established enterprises that have broadened their bases of 
ownership by including more rural residents (typicaJJy, kinfolk of the principals) 
among the holders of shares. UsuaJJy, the villagers have been content to leave 
management (including most policymaking) to their urban associates--a situation 
that can be expected to change if and when such businesses suffer continual losses! 
An interesting switch in the situation just noted occurs with respect to the 
Teop-Tinputz Development Enterprises. While this business is based in the Teop-
Tinputz region, and managed loc,ally, several individuals from the region living and 
working in the urban area owned shares in the company, and thereby retained some 
economic ties with their home viJJages. 
Most of the business mentioned above involve owners and managers belonging 
to one or another ethnic group, or sub-group (e.g., only north Nasiois, or Guavas, or 
Siwais, etc.). More recently there have been started one or two businesses that 
include owners and managers from two or more ethnic groups--e.g., the 
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Bougainville Marketing Coop, whose directors include individuals from Siwai, Buka, 
Kieta, and Buin. And there is at least one urban company I know of, Arawa 
Contractors, consisting of partners from Bougainville and mainland New Guinea; 
there may be others unknown to me. 
Finally, there are of course the several enterprises under the respective 
umbrellas of the BougainviJle Development Corporation and the Panguna Develop-
ment Foundation whose operations and earnings could have important economic 
consequences for a large number of BougalnviJJians, but whose present financial 
conditions and future financial prospects are much better known to the target 
readers of this report than to myself. 
Before closing this brief inventory of the kinds of business that have been and 
are being developed by O'r for Bougainvillians in the Province's main urban area, a 
word of caution is called for, lest some readers be persuaded to consider them a 
panacea. Briefly stated, the caution has to do with the numbers of urban businesses 
and with their indigenous managers' business skills. 
A t present writing the urban setting is an open frontier, inviting many kinds 
of new businesses hitherto untried there. As each new kind of business is 
established it enjoys the economic advantage of monopoly--until another one like it 
comes along. In other words, as more and more indigenous businesses become 
established in the Province'S urban areas, competition will sharpen, and success will 
depend more and more upon the display of kinds of managerial skills for which 
BougainviJJians have traditionally had little indoctrination or training. Bougain-
villians' dominant social values and attitudes have been learned in rural settings, 
where benevolence and cooperation with neighbors outweigh self-seeking' profit. 
Conducting a business in an urban setting is subject to fewer and weaker social 
pressures than those surrounding (and often stifling) a village trade-store, but such 
pressures will probably persist, even in Arawa and Kieta, for a long time to corne. 
It remains to be seen whether Bougainvillian businessmen operating in urban 
centers will be able to acquire enough marketplace attitudes-at the expense of 
their rural based values-to conduct their businesses profitably in a more 
competitive setting. 
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13. Investment and Savings 
In a Melanesian Society like Bougainville's, categories like "investment" and 
"savings" are as difficult to define as they are to quantify. Even where money is 
the value "invested" or "saved," some of the enterprises deposited in and the 
dividends expected or realized, are wholly unlike those dealt with in conventional 
Economics. And even where the "business" invested in has some of the appearance 
of a straightforward retail outlet, or a producer or transport co-op, the 
management of the business and the definition and distribution (if any) of "profits" 
are, as described earlier, often too bizarre to comprehend. 
As is well known, many Bougainvillians "save" their money by burying it, 
thereby obtaining dividends only in the form of mental comfort. And many others 
invest it in woolly enterprises that bring them neither dividends nor the recovery of 
the amounts invested. Unfortunately, I see no possibility of discovering how much 
of Bougainvillians' money stagnates or disappears in these ways, but I suspect that 
the amount would be found to be very large-large enough to warrant the initiation 
of an official public-education program aimed at reducing its size. 
Nor do I have any idea about the quantities of Bougainvillians' money 
invested in enterprises that do yield dividends. A few examples of such enterprises, 
including estimates of their earnings and dividend distributions, are supplied in 
some of the reports I have drawn on, but these are too few and randomly scattered 
to provide any credible picture for the Province as a whole. 
There remain two other forms of interest- or dividend-yielding money usage 
that are publicly reported and that do earn money, or may be expected to earn 
money, for Bougainvillians; I refer of course to registered savings banks and, 
mainly, to BCL and BOC. In writing this report I do not have available to me any 
recent figures concerning numbers of Bougainvillian depositors and share-holders, 
or amounts of earned interest and dividends. Such figures, however, need to be 
included in any quantitative survey of Bougainvillians' money-earning activities. 
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14. Urban Life: A Postscript 
After preparing a first draft of this report, copies of it were sent to several 
other members of our research program for their comments, amendments, etc. 
Most of the comments, etc. received have been incorporated in the text of the 
preceding sections, but one of them, by Richard Bedford, deserves quoting in full 
inasmuch as it serves to correct a bias evident in the original draft of the report. 
Bedford puts it as follows: 
There is one general matter which struck me as I read through your 
material and this relates to the very obvious rural bias in the content 
and arguments. And while I see this as being very logical given that 
80 per cent or more of the Province'S population still live in rural 
communities I think more explicit mention could be made of some 
problems the urban area and its residents will face in the future. 
Inevitably the drift to towns in southeast Bougainville will continue. 
When prices for cocoa drop (copra has already fallen sharply since 
1974 and cocoa prices may also have gone down by now) the returns 
from cash cropping may no longer seem as attractive as a regular 
wage income in town, especially for the younger men and women with 
some experience of urban residence while attending schools or 
visiting kin/friends. Collapse of the copra market has led to a rapid 
acceleration of townward migration in the New Hebrides and Fiji. I 
am sure Bougainville will not escape this sort of trend. You do 
mention the limited opportunities for wage employment in towns in 
Section 9. But I think something should also be said to the effect that 
Bougainville's planners and administrators (who are mostly urban-
resident) must expect growth in an under-employed/unemployed 
population living in sub-standard housing near, if not in, the existing 
towns. Low cost housing schemes and subdivisions in poorly 
ventilated/drained land set aside for no-covenant housing are not 
going to prevent this. By January 1974 there were already quite 
extensive 'squatter' settlements behind Arawa, south of Toniva, and 
scattered among plantations between Kieta and Kobuan. Not all 
residents were Bougainvillian, but this component in the squatter 
population was growing. 
Perhaps more significant than this trend is the effect of inflation on 
living standards of urban-dwellers. Alex Mamak did some useful 
work on this subject and has demonstrated in income/expenditure 
surveys that many of the households dependent on the wages of 
unskilled or semi-skilled employees were finding it difficult to make 
ends meet in 1973/74. This was especially the case for employees of 
the then District Administration. Not only were they required to pay 
quite high utilities charges which BCL covered for its employees, but 
their wages were generally lower. Among this group difficulties in 
making ends meet were quite common. 
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It could be argued that if they find life in town too hard they can 
always 'go home' to the village. But for some town is now 'home' and 
in the future the urban born and raised population on Bougainville will 
increase quite rapidly. In this regard Moulik's very interesting 
typology misses one group in Bougainville's population-the wage-
earning proletariat. This group comprises a very small proportion of 
the total population at present, but, again, it will grow. I'm no social 
psychologist, but in Moulik's terms I would class many of the 
emerging proletariat as having medium achievement motivation, low-
medium affiliation motivation, and low-medium power motivation. 
They are not all 'entrepreneurial managers' although there is, of 
course, this group in the urban as well as the rural population. 
A few points more might be raised with reference to urbanisation 
both in the immediate past and future: rising crime rates (I think we 
mentioned this in our very general paper in Jackson's volume i.e., 
Bedford and Mamak, 1976 (b); increasing inequalities in income; 
standard of accommodation, consumption patterns and general levels 
of living; increasing class consciousness and new sorts of divisions in 
an essentially classless society. You touch on most of these matters 
in different sections of the report but I wonder if more explicit 
mention of their urban dimensions is also required. 
Alex Mamak and I have covered most of the issues raised above in our 
publications; we certainly will be making much more of them in our 
proposed book. 
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15. Major Conclusions 
Bougainvillians have reached a stage in their westernization at which they 
are wanting-and in some respects actually needing--considerable amounts of 
money to satisfy their material requirements (and perhaps social aspirations). 
Moreover, those wants are increasing at such a rate for the population as a whole 
that there are reasonable doubts that they can be satisfied, even in the near future, 
and even by any but a small number of Bougainvillians. 
The factors contributing most heavily to this impending crisis are the 
following: 
1. The Bougainvillians' increasing, and in some respects undiscriminating, 
desire for goods and services that can only be obtained with money. 
2. The population's rapid and accelerating rate of increase-one of the 
world's highest. 
3. The constraints upon money-based, Western-style prosperity imposed 
by the Province's isola,ted location, small size, and intractable 
geography. 
Concerning the first of these factors, contrary to a widely voiced sentiment, 
Bougainvillians-in comparison with other equivalent populations of PNG-already 
possess relatively large amounts of money and the goods and services obtainable 
with money, and relative large opportunities for earning money. By no stretch of 
the imagination can they be accurately described as PNG's "orphans" in terms of 
their material welfare-and especially not in terms of the westernized components 
of that welfare. 
Nevertheless, Bougainvillians' wants for such goods and services continue to 
increase, individually and in the aggregate-partly as a result of imitation of 
expatriates' consumption patterns (which they have continual opportunities to 
observe), partly as a result of the tantalizing view of imported goods afforded by 
the Province's well-stocked stores, and partly-one must add-by their views 
(inspired both by cargoistic hopes and politically-based promises) that there are few 
limits to the desirable things they deserve and in fact could obtain (if certain 
political solutions and economic changes would only come about). 
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Paradoxically, the mental attitude just described (which is widely-but 
probably not universal1y~hared) conflicts somewhat with another widely held 
sentiment favoring a return to "ancestral" Bougainvillian values and life-styles. 
(Whether the modum conceptualization of those values and life styles is in fact like 
those of the "ancestors" in all respects is open to argument, but it does envisage, 
among other things, less dependence upon Western type goods.) 
. I am unable to judge which of these opposing kinds of mental attitudes is the 
more widely held-in fact, many BougainviUians seem to hold both of them, 
without discomfort about the contradiction involved. On the surface, however, it 
appears that the desire for more (rather than less) Western-style goods and services 
predominates. 
Turning now to the second of the factors contributing to the crisis foretold 
in this report, namely, to the Province'S explosive rate of population increase, there 
is little more that needs to be said, other than noting that there exists In this 
matter two views that are no less contradictory than the ones just characterized. 
On the one hand, our researchers have heard some Bougainvillians (mainly younger, 
more highly educated ones) express a desire, rationalized in various ways, for fewer 
offspring. And on the other hand, there are the widely favored views for larger 
families-views based partly on religion, partly on political ideals, and partly on 
notions that large families were characteristic of the ancestral way of life. 
The third set of factors contributing to the Province's impending economic 
crisis-namely, the constraints imposed by the islands' location, size, and 
geography-are too numerous and complex to summarize here. It may however be 
useful to emphasize once again that they are also absolute: nothing can be done to 
change them. Even with vastly speedier and cheaper forms of transport, the 
Province will always remain isolated, relative to other centers of high population. 
Also, its size relative to area/population ratios of mainland PNG will remain small 
in the foreseeable future. And its geographical constraints-slopes, drainage 
patterns, etc.--cannot be significantly altered for the better except by engineering 
feats too costly to contemplate. 
The effects of these constraints could of course be mitigated in some 
respects-for example, arrangements might be made to permit and encourage 
Bougainvillians to emigrate to mainland PNG; a brake might be applied to the 
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headlong, unplanned conversion of garden land into cash-cropping; fallow-time 
could be shortened and garden productivity increased by introduction of new crops 
and/or agricultural techniques; etc. But all these measures will require a major 
effort in comprehensive assessment (including an accurate census), planning, 
experimentation, and long-range and consistent implementation. 
In addition to the above, there are some other trends now prevalent in the 
Province-trends that many Bougainvillians may disapprove of-which are likely to 
increase unless deliberate efforts are made to stay or reverse them. Reference 
here is to the growing disparities-individual and regional-in economic 
opportunities and, consequently, in economic well-being and social equality. Some 
of this is probably inevitable; but if Bougainvillians in general wish to retain the, in 
my view, admirable degree of social-equalitarianism that prevailed in ancestral 
times the attainment of that objective cannot be left to chance. 
My colleagues and I have not been asked by the Provincial authorities to 
make recommendations regarding the matters discussed in this Report. Also, any 
appropriate recommendations for planning and action will have to be formulated in 
terms of BougainviUians' own social and political goals-which I as an outsider am 
not qualified to define. Because of the relatively greater objectivity in which a 
trained observer can study a society other than his own he (or she!) may be able to 
describe with some accuracy how another society operates, and predict with some 
degree of probability where it is headed. But no outsider is in a position to say how 
it should go. 
Finally, I wish to point out that the findings summarized in this Report are 
based mainly on the researches of social scientists of the "softer" variety-i.e., 
anthropologists, geographers, and sociologists. It was with some satisfaction, 
therefore, to have these findings corroborated by an economist-a representative 
of that "hardest" social science. I refer to the paper by M.L. Treadgold, "The 
Regional Economy of Bougainville: Growth and Structural Change", which 
received after the Report was completed and typed. Treadgold's approach is a 
macro-economic analysis, based entirely on published documents. It will appear in 
print in its entirety, but I am adding an excerpt from it as an appendix to this 
Report. 
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APPENDIX 
Excerpt from M.L. Treadgold, "The Regional Economy of Bougainvil1e: Growth and 
Structural Change." Occasional Paper No. 10. Development Studies Centre, The 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1978 [pp. 65-68] * 
At the beginning of this paper Bougainville was described as being in a 
process of economic transition. Now, having examined mainly historical change, 
there remain the questions of whether the process will be sustained and, if so, in 
what manner. Definitive answers are of course impossible, but in this last 
substantive section an attempt is made to identify some of the key issues, including 
the economic implications of possible changes in the political status of the region. 
Sustained export-led growth or technological dualism? 
Unless a smelter is constructed on Bougainvil1e to covert concentrate into 
blister copper, there seems Ii ttle prospect of the copper-mining industry continuing 
to act as a leading sector in the growth of the Bougainville regional economy. A 
decision about smelting will depend, inter alia, on (l) the comparative costs of 
transportation of concentrate and blister to northern hemisphere markets, (2) 
developments in copper-mining in other regions of PNG which, if successful may 
make attractive an alternative prospect of a single processing faciltiy in a more 
centralised location such as on the Gulf of Papua where advantage could be taken 
of the Purari hydro-electricity potential, (3) levels and expected movements of 
foreign processing costs, international metal prices and local factor costs relative 
to each other, (4) the existence of markets for sulphuric acid, a by-product of 
smelting (or, in the absence of these markets, costs of waste disposal), and (5) the 
future political situation in PNG. 
Judging from what can be gauged of these factors, a Bougainvil1e smelter is 
unlikely in the forseeable future. In its absence, the real direct contribution of 
*Reprinted by kind permission of the author. 
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copper-mining to regional economic activity is likely to be roughly constant in the 
short to medium term and to decline gradually in the long run, as the mineral 
content of the ore decreases. 36 Indirectly, mining has created some potential for 
further regional growth based on import-replacing food production and industrial 
development serving the new urban markets of Kieta-ArawaPanguna (which may 
have a population of the order of 20,000 before the end of the century); and, once 
established, there may be scope for some of these activities to gain additionally a 
foothold in extra-regional export markets in neighbouring areas such as New 
Britain, New Ireland and the Solomon Islands (Scott 1973: 6-2). However, import-
replacement aimed at urban markets will be essentially a once-and-for-all process, 
offering quick immediate gains, but little sustained long-term growth in demand; 
and there can be no guarantees about subsequent moves into export markets by 
food producers and manufacturers, given what Garnaut (1974:31) has termed the 
'high resistances associated with historical trade patterns' and competition from 
other suppliers enjoying advantages cif terms of relative factor prices and already 
exploiting substantial economies of scale. 
In these circumstances,it is' necessary to look to other sectors for potential 
growth stimuli. They 'appear to be strongest in the traditional area of agricultural 
exports, although there are also prospects for the export of other primary produce 
such as timber and, possibly, marine products. Admittedly, within agriculture, the 
expatriate- and foreign-owned pl~mtations are unlikely to 'experience further 
significant expansion beCause of political constraints associated with nationalistic 
sentiment and income-distributional issues. However, smallholder production of 
cocoa and copra suffers from no such liabilities and offers scope for widespread 
participation by indigenous Bougainvilleans. With the substantial improvement in 
infrastructure (especially transport links) in the last decade, the effects on 
incentives of exposure to consumption levels and patterns within the mining 
enclave, and recently favourable prices, conditions now appear ripe for the 
smallholder sector to resume, unchallenged, its previous leading sector role in 
regional economic growth. 
36This statement is based on the assumption that there will not be any new 
copper mines developed on Bougainville. Such a possibility cannot be ruled out 
completely, but there has been no indication of it in Government or Company 
announcements, and there would probably be considerable local opposition to the 
establishment of another mine. 
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Future expansion is, however, likely to be qualitively different from that of 
the past. Hitherto, cash-cropping for export has occurred almost exclusively as a 
supplement to subsistence food production, a process made possible by the 
existence of surplus or spare resources of both land and labour. Evidence is now 
accumulating (e.g. Ward 1975:97-101; Moulik 1977:44-5) to suggest that in some areas 
at least the process of expansion is beginning to exhaust available supplies of labour 
and that within individual holdings further increases in export production can occur, 
given existing levels of technology in both export and subsistence production, only 
at the expense of subsistence production. This situation points, in turn, to the 
probability that within the next few decades the smallholder sector will move 
substantially into what Myint (1973:35) has typified as the second phase of peasant 
export expansion when some household units begin to specialise or devote the whole 
of their available resources to export production. Shand (1965) has demonstrated in 
a general PNG context the nature of the income gains to be made from this shift in 
resource allocation, not only for the units specialising in export crops, but also for 
the units who correspondingly specialise in producing a marketable surplus of 
subsistence foodstuffs to meet the cash demands now flowing from the former 
units. 
Of course, progress towards specialisation may be slowed through caution 
induced by the greater risks associated with sole reliance on export commodities 
that have a history of notoriously unstable prices. On the other hand, the eventual 
rewards are potentially great. In additon to the very large static gains accruing 
from the exploitation of comparative advantage and (possibly) increasing returns at 
the household level, specialisation facilitates productivity-increasing technical 
progress and capital formation; it encourages the development of factor markets, 
particularly for labour and perhaps, at a later stage, land; and it enhances the 
opportunities for backward and forward linkage (production of intermediate inputs 
and processing of crops respectively) and for some local non-food consumer goods 
industries. 
This development path appears to hold great promise, but the economic 
history of other less developed areas indicates that it is not one along which the 
inital steps automatically and inevitably trigger a continous movement. In 
specialising, smallholders may take full advantage of the static benefits of a more 
efficient allocation of resources, but fail to exploit (perhaps for reasons beyond 
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beyond their control) what Myint (1973:39) has termed the 'technical opportunities' 
for improving their productivity that are conferred by specialisation. If this 
happens, then expansion wiH sti11 continue as long as unused land is available and 
population growth augments labour supplies. However: 
Sooner or later the extension of cultivation wi11 press against the 
limits of cultivable hinterland, and thereafter population growth wi11 
outstrip export expansion and lead to a situation of overpopulation 
and 'disguised employment' in agriculture. (Myint 1973:39). 
In short, the prospect of self-sustaining, export-led growth may collapse into the 
reality of stagnant technological dualism characterised, on the one hand, by a 
foreign-owned, capital-intensive advanced enclave (copper-mining) offering limited 
scope for factor substitution and hence limited employment opportunities and, on 
the other hand, by a much larger (in terms of labour absorption) traditional rural 
sector using primitive and highly .labour-intensive techniques to yield a marginal 
product of labour approaching zero. 
Although it would be premature and alarmist to forecast such a situation for 
Bougainville, two necessary (bUt not sufficient) conditions for its emergence appear 
to be present already. One, previously discussed, is the limited scope for further 
expansion of the output (and hence employment) of the mining-oriented modern 
sector of the economy. The other is the extremely rapid rate of growth of the 
population of the region, even discounting for the effects of immigration during the 
construction phase of the copper project. The long run implications of the present 
very high rate of natural increase can be easily overlooked in the present situation 
of relatively abundant agricultural land and incipient labour shortages. Ward 
(1975:67-73) has roughly estimated that the Buin sub-district of southwest 
Bougainville, which contains about a third of the indigenous population of the 
region, could support through subsistence agriculture alone without any improve-
ments in technology at least three times its 1972 village population at living 
standards equivalent to those of the early 1960s. Alternatively, if all suitable land 
were used for cocoa production (apparently again without any improvements in 
technology), the estimated supportable population would rise to some six times its 
1972 level. However, Ward (1975:29) has also estimated the rate of growth of the 
vi11age population in the sub-district over the period 1963-72 to have been as great 
86 
., 
REFERENCES* 
Bedford, R. D. 
1974 New Towns on Bougainville. 'Australian Geographer 12(6):551-556. 
Bedford, R. D. and A. F.lVIamak 
1975 A Town Counc;il Election on Bougainville. South Pacific Commis-
sion Bulletin 25:45-50. 
1976a 
1976b 
1977 
Connell, J. 
1976 
BougainviHians in Urban Wage Employment: Aspects of Migrant 
Flows and Adaptive Str9.tegies. Oceania 46(3). 
Kieta, Arawa and Panguna: Towns in Bougainville. In R. Jackson 
(ed.), An Introduction to the Urban GeQgraphy of Papua New 
Guinea. Occ;asional Paper, Department of Geography, University 
of Papua New Guinea. 
Compensating for Development: The Bougainville Case. 80ugain-
ville Social Publication No.2. University of Canterbury, 
Chr istchurch. 
New Towns in Bougainville: Copper Mining and Urban-Industrial 
Development in a Melanesian Society. In preparation. 
Migr9.nts and Mining in Southeast Bougainville. Bougainville 
Special Publication. In press. 
Bougainville Copper and Trade Unionism. Bougainville Special 
Publication. In press. 
Bougainvllle is Legitimate Again? The Geographical Magazine, 
London, August. 
1976 Buin. In R. Jackson (ed.), An Introductio'l to the Urban Geography 
of Papua New Guinea. Occasional P~per, Department of 
Geography, University of Papua New Guinea. 
1977 Hunting and Gathering: The Forage Economy of the Siwai of 
Bougainville. Development Studies Centre (A.N.V), Oc;casional 
Paper No.6. 
1977 Local Government Councils in Bougainville. Bougainville Special 
Publication No.3. University of Canterbury, Christchurch. 
*NOTE: All authors listed were members of the Research Program except those 
identified with an asterisk. 
88 
as 4 per cent per annum. If this were to continue, the total population of the area 
would treble in as little as 28 years and increase six-fold in no more than 46 years. 
Considerable caution is needed in interpreting this simple Malthusian 
arthmetic, and ever greater caution is required if it is extrapolated to the whole of 
the region; but it does highlight a potential trap in the likely future growth path of 
the Bougainville economy~ It also highlights the importance of policy action in a 
sphere that has to date generated little sense of urgency, not just in BougainviUe 
but throughout PNG. However,even if population growth is significantly reduced 
(a formidable task in itself), sustained per capita regional growth will still require 
in addition continuing increases in smallholder productivity. Specialisation, it has 
been argued, facillitates these. increases,but it does not ensure them. Once again, 
there will clearly be a need for policy action, in this instance aimed at ensuring 
adequate flows of technical assistance (in a broad sense) and capital funds to the 
smallholder sector. 
87 
1977 Th,e People of Siwai: Population Change in a Solomon Island 
Society. 'Department of Demography (A.N.U.), Papers in 
Demography, No.8. Canberra. 
The Bougainville Connection: Changes in the Economic Context 
of Shell Money Production in Malaita. Unpublished manuscript. 
1978 The Death of Taro: Local Response to a Change of Subsistence 
Crops in the Northern Solomons. Mankind 11(4). In press. 
n.d. Subsistence and Affluence: Economic and Social Change in a 
Solomon Island Society. In preparation. ** 
Connell, J. and M. P. Hamnett 
Hamnett, M. P. 
1977 
Harris, G. T. 
1975 
Mamak, A. F. 
Famine or Feast: Sago Production in Bougainvil1e. Journal of the 
Polynesian Society. In press. 
Households on the Move: Settlement Pattern Among a Group of 
Eivo and Simeku Speakers in Central Bougainville.Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii. 
"Illness, Diagnosis and Cures in the Atarno Valley of Central 
Bougainville. (Accepted for publication in ASAO monograph on 
curing in Oceania, R., Ward and A. Johnnes.) In preparation. 
The 1973/4 Urban Household Survey: The Bougainville Towns. 
Department of Economics, U.P.N.G. Discussion Paper No. 20. 
Nationalism, Race-class Consciousness, and Social Research on 
Bougainville Island, Papua New Guinea. In Colin Bell and Sol 
Encel (eds.), Inside the Whale. Pergamon Press. In press. 
Mamak, A. F. and R. D. Bedford (see also Bedford and Mamak) 
1974a Bougainville's Students: Some Expressed Feelings Toward Non-
Bougainvillians, Arawa Town and the Copper Mining Company. 
'New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and Southeast Asia 9(1): 4-
15. 
1976 Race, Class and Ethnicity: Labour Relations in the South Pacific 
with Special Reference to Bougainville and Fiji. Journal de la 
Societe des Oceanistes. In press. . 
1977 Inequality in the Bougainvi11e Copper Industry: Some Implications. 
In F. Stevens (ed.), Racism, Vol. 3, second edition. 
**Subsequently appeared as Taim Bilong Mani. Monograph No. 12 of Development 
Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1978. 
89 
Mamak, A. F., and R. D. Bedford, with L. Hannett and M. Havini 
1974b BougainviUian Nationalism: Aspects of Unity and Discord~ 
Bougainville Special Publication No.1. University of Canterbury, 
Christchurch. 
*Mitchell, D. 
1976 Land and Agriculture in Nagovisi, Papua New Guinea. Monograph 
3, Institute of APelied Social and Economic Research. Boroko, 
P.N.G. 
Gardening for Money: Land and Agriculture in Nagovisi. 
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
Measuring Gardens and Garden Yields. Unpublished manuscript. 
*Mitchell, D. anq J. Nash* 
MouUk, T. K. 
1977 
*Nash, J. 
1972 
Nagovisi Birth Intervals. Unpublished manuscript. 
Bougainvil1e in Transition. Development Studies Centre, A.N.U. 
Monograph No.7, Canberra. 
Aspects of Matriliny in Nagovisi Society. Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
1974 Matriliny and Modernization: T~e Nagovisi of South Bougainville. 
New Guinea Research Bulletin, No. 55, New Guinea Research 
Unit, Port Moresby and Canberra. 
*Ogan, E. with J. Nash* and D. Mitchell* 
1976 Culture Change and Fertility in Two BougainviUe Populations. In 
E. Giles and J. Friedlaender (eds.), The Measures of Man: 
Shoffner, R. K. 
1976 
Treadgold, M. L. 
Methodology in Biological Anthroeology. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Peabody Museum Press. 
The Economic and Cultural Ecology of Teop: An Analysis of the 
Fishing, Gardening, and Cash-cropping System in a Melanesian 
Society. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawaii. 
1977 Regional Income in Papua New Guinea. Paper delivered at the 
Sixth Conference of Economists, Hobart, 1t;i-20 May, 1977, of the 
Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. 
1978 The Regional Economy of Bougainville: Growth and Structural 
Change. Occasional Paeer No. 10. Development Studi~s Center, 
The Australian National University, Canberra. 
90 
.. 
, . 
Ward, M. W. 
1975 Road and Development in Southwest Bougainville. New Guinea 
Research Bulletin, No. 62. New Guinea Research Unit, A.N.U., 
Port Moresby and Canberra. 
91 
